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THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE COMMERCE POWER
Richard A. Epstein*
T HE Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes"'-such is the clause in the Constitution to
which most federal power can be traced in today's general welfare
state. The labor statutes, the civil rights statutes, the farm and ag-
ricultural statutes, and countless others rest on the commerce
power, or more accurately on a construction of the commerce
clause that grants the federal government jurisdiction so long as it
can show (as it always can) that the regulated activity burdens,
obstructs, or affects interstate commerce, however indirectly. Is
this underlying interpretation of the commerce clause correct? 2
The entire inquiry may be idle theoretical speculation, or it may
have profound practical importance. I cannot say which, although
at present I should guess the former; too much water has passed
over the dam for there to be a candid judicial reexamination of the
commerce clause that looks only to first principles. Still, in an age
* James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This Article was originally
presented as a paper at a Conference on Economic Liberties and the Constitution held at
the United States Department of Justice in June 1986. A revised version of the paper was
presented at a Conference on the Constitution held at Bowling Green University in October
1987. I wish to give thanks to Professor Edmund Kitch of the University of Virginia School
of Law and my colleague David Currie for their especially insightful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper. I have also benefitted from discussions with Dennis Hutchinson and
Michael McConnell.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
More accurately, the inquiry might be stated: How should the grant to Congress be
understood when the commerce clause is construed in light of the necessary and proper
clause? See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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in which the theory of government is again subject to general theo-
retical discussion, it is instructive to ask, as a matter both of first
principle and of Supreme Court precedent: What is the proper
construction of the grant of congressional power contained within
article I, section 8, clause 3?
In Part I of this Article, I introduce the question of the scope of
the commerce power by discussing its intended role in limiting
government power and its relation to the individual rights protec-
tions of the Constitution. In Parts II and III, I analyze the text of
the commerce clause and look at the place of the commerce clause
in the overall constitutional structure. Finally, in Parts IV and V, I
analyze the clause in light of the cases that have construed and
extended its scope during our entire constitutional history. My
analysis places special emphasis on the fifty-year period of the rise
of the administrative state, from the onset of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission in 1887 to the height of the New Deal. My con-
clusion is clear enough. I think that the expansive construction of
the clause accepted by the New Deal Supreme Court is wrong, and
clearly so, and that a host of other interpretations are more consis-
tent with both the text and the structure of our constitutional
government.
I. THE PROBLEM: STRUCTURE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The commerce power is not a comprehensive grant of federal
power. It does not convert the Constitution from a system of gov-
ernment with enumerated federal powers into one in which the
only subject matter limitations placed on Congress are those which
it chooses to impose upon itself. Nor does the "necessary and
proper" clause work to change this basic design; although it seeks
to insure that the federal power may be exercised upon its appro-
priate targets, it is not designed to run roughshod over the entire
scheme of enumerated powers that precedes it in the Constitution.3
If forced to summarize what the commerce clause means, I would
I This theme of limited and enumerated powers was central to the distinction between a
federal and national government. It is evident on the face of article I, which begins with the
words "All legislative powers herein granted" (without specifying who the grantor was), and
it was reiterated in all the ratification debates. See, e.g., 2 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 435-36, 454, 540 (J. Elliot 2d ed.
1836) (dialogue of Wilson and McKean); 3 id. at 95, 246, 444, 553 (dialogue of Madison,
Nicholas, and Marshall); 4 id. at 147-49, 259-60 (dialogue of Iredell and Pinckney).
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say that it refers more to "commerce" as that term has been devel-
oped in connection with the "negative" or "dormant" commerce
clause cases, which concern the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce and the goods that are shipped into it. Stated otherwise, the
term commerce has a stable usage in various other contexts. Zon-
ing for "commercial" uses, for example, is often used in opposition
to zoning for "manufacturing" uses. The Uniform Commercial
Code does not cover the law of manufacturers. More generally, the
idea of commerce seems closer to the idea of "trade" than to other
economic activities. It is in just this sense that the term was used
in ordinary discourse at the time of the founding. Hume's essay Of
Commerce, for example, explicitly places the idea of commerce in
opposition to that of manufacturing.4 The same usage, restrictive
by modern standards, was adopted by Hamilton, who for example
in the Federalist No. 11 uses commerce as a synonym for trade and
navigation, and links his discussion of the commerce power with
the need to have an American navy to police and protect the seas.5
But whatever the uncertainties, commerce does not comprise the
sum of all productive activities in which individuals may engage.
There is at least a slight irony here, for the Uniform Commercial
Code is enacted under state law, whereas everything from manu-
facturing to welfare is regulated comprehensively at the federal
level.
Finding the proper interpretation is of course no easy task. One
great problem has to do with the function of the commerce clause
itself. The Constitution contains two general types of provisions;
I See, D. Hume, Of Commerce (1752), reprinted in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary
252, 263-64 (Liberty Classics ed. 1985). Hume's basic theory was that nations that tolerate
foreign commerce are able to realize gains from trade that permit them to accumulate
greater wealth, and to achieve greater prosperity and political stability, than those that rely
upon domestic manufacture and agriculture alone. Hume's essay mixes historical example
with analytical propositions in a style that anticipates the Federalist.
I The Federalist No. 11 (A. Hamilton) ("Concerning Commerce and a Navy"). The oppo-
sition between commerce on the one hand, and agriculture and manufacture on the other,
seems clear enough. Thus in speaking of the control over foreign commerce, Hamilton wrote:
By prohibitory regulations, extending, at the same Time throughout the States, we
may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our mar-
kets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the
importance of the markets of three millions of people-increasing in rapid progres-
sion, for the most part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local cir-
cumstances to remain so-to any manufacturing nation.
Id. at 63 (Modern Library College ed. 1937).
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the first class is structural and was designed to divide powers be-
tween state and federal government, and, at the federal level, be-
tween the different branches of government. The second class was
designed to protect individual rights against wrongdoing by gov-
ernment. The two types of provisions are in some sense parts of an
integral strategy to ensure that the government, state or federal,
does not become the enemy of the very people whom it is organ-
ized to protect. But the provisions work in very different ways, and
their proper construction proceeds along rather different paths.
In considering guaranties of individual rights, we address the
highest ends of government and civilization. Generally it is possi-
ble to look to the common law, to a rich political theory, and to a
long political tradition in order to gather hints about what these
provisions mean and how they should function. The framers un-
derstood the protection of speech, contract, and property as ends
good in themselves, as rights so "natural" and ends so clear that
they did not receive the intellectual justification they so desper-
ately needed-and still need. In reading these provisions, we can
draw upon a large body of materials to guide our interpretation:
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, and a host of lesser, but still
able, writers.' The differences that emerge in dealing with these
questions are often attributable to the richness and the centrality
of their subject, not to the want of speculation about them.
Provisions that go to the question of jurisdiction are no less im-
portant to sound governance than those that govern individual
rights. Yet jurisdictional principles have a very different intellec-
tual pedigree. Jurisdiction is not part of ordinary moral discourse,
or of our common understanding of right and wrong. Instead, juris-
diction is always regarded as a means towards an end rather than
as an end in itself. Hamilton treated jurisdiction as a more effec-
tive guarantor of individual rights than a bill of rights, because he
believed that it provided clear and powerful lines to keep govern-
ment from straying beyond its appointed limits.7 Hamilton's judg-
' See, e.g, T. Hobbes, Leviathan (Everyman's Library ed. 1950) (1651); D. Hume, supra
note 4; J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (R. Wilburn ed. 1947) (1689);
Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (T. Nugent trans. 1949) (1748).
7 The Federalist No. 84 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton continued:
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights ... are not only unnecessary in the pro-
posed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various excep-
tions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pre-
[Vol. 73:13871390
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ment was, I think, wrong to the extent that it relied on jurisdic-
tional provisions as the sole limit to government power.8 But it
contained a fair measure of good sense in using jurisdictional limi-
tations as an important, indeed indispensable, limitation upon gov-
ernment power.
The difficulty lies in construing jurisdictional provisions to
achieve this political end. Here there is no comparable tradition of
political philosophy upon which to draw. The classical writers who
extolled the virtues of liberty and property did not have the practi-
cal experience of the founders in forming governments. The great
debates over the social contract always asked the question of how
individuals in a state of nature could enter into a social contract
for their mutual advantage. They never considered the possibility
that in practice social contract theory would be tested in a world in
which it was hardly clear whether Sovereign States or ordinary
persons were the contracting parties. It is hardly surprising there-
fore that the classical writers never addressed federalism, enumer-
text to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done
which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of
the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed?
Id. at 559 (Modern Library College ed. 1937). Hamilton's argument presupposes that the
doctrine of enumerated powers places substantial limitations upon all grants of power to the
federal government, including those under the commerce power.
' Thus Hamilton thought that the principle of freedom of speech could not protect the
press from arbitrary taxation:
It cannot certainly be pretended that any degree of duties, however low, would be an
abridgment of the liberty of the press. . . . And if duties of any kind may be laid
without a violation of that liberty, it is evident that the extent must depend on legis-
lative discretion, regulated by public opinion; so that, after all, general declarations
respecting the liberty of the press, will give it no greater security than it will have
without them.
Id. at 560 n.
Hamilton was clearly wrong on this issue. It may not be possible to use the first amend-
ment to insist that the press be free of all general taxes, but it is possible to limit the nature
of the taxes that are imposed, so that special taxes placed upon the press, but not other
industries, are prohibited, or that special taxes placed on some portions of the press, but not
others, are prohibited. Courts have intervened to prevent disproportionate taxation when
public opinion has failed to do so. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936). Grosjean has had little development because its holding was clear enough to stop
most forms of abusive taxes in their tracks.
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ated powers, and jurisdiction, even though these form fundamental
features of our constitutional system.9
We must, therefore, examine this question in an artificial world
devoid of theories of natural rights. We must take our cue from
more immediate, technical considerations. Or so it seems. Appear-
ances are deceiving, however, and I shall argue throughout this Ar-
ticle that the reasons for the expansion of the commerce clause
were strongly substantive. The rationale for limited government
became obscure in an age when the Progressive tradition of good
government came to dominate American intellectual life.10 Judges
who were persuaded that national solutions were needed for na-
tional problems could hardly be expected to invoke the commerce
clause as a barrier to federal action when they believed in the im-
portance of popular democracy, the soundness of the underlying
legislation, the need for national uniformity, or all three. A judge's
view of the commerce clause might be very different, however, if
the perils of collective choice and the wisdom of the underlying
substantive legislation were called into question. A court which
shared the framers' view of government as a necessary evil could, if
it so chose, put more teeth into the commerce clause than has ex-
isting case law.
Cases from both the Progressive Era and the New Deal showed a
close fusion between issues of substantive rights and questions of
federal jurisdiction. The very attitudes that led to- the demise of
substantive due process protection of economic liberties lay behind
9 Some sense of the twist of history is found in Patrick Henry's speech in opposition to
the ratification of the Constitution in the Virginia debates:
[W]hat right had they to say, We, the People? My political curiosity, exclusive of my
anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, who authorized them to
speak the language of, We, the People instead of We, the States? States are the
characterisitics, and the soul of a confederation. If the states be not the agents of this
compact, it must be one great consolidated National Government of the people of all
the States.
H. Storing, What the Antifederalists Were For 12 (1981) (quoting Henry). Henry was a
better prophet than even his supporters would have allowed at the time. Storing rightly
notes that the Anti-Federalists were on their strongest ground when they used a principle of
ratification that put the Constitution into effect, at least as between the parties, when nine
states ratified it. Under the Articles of the Confederation, each state had a blocking position
against the changes, and Rhode Island had not bothered to send a delegate to the Philadel-
phia Convention.
'0 See A. Ekirch, Progressivism in America: A Study of the Era from Theodore Roosevelt
to Woodrow Wilson (1974).
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judicial interpretation of the commerce clause." To trace this his-
tory, it is necessary to discard the aura of inevitability that modern
courts and writers have placed around the commerce clause.12 At
each stage in the historical analysis, the right question to ask is:
Was this extension of federal power justified by the text and struc-
ture of the Constitution? There are no shortcuts in the journey.
Let us start with the text.
II. THE TEXT
The first place to look to find the meaning of the commerce
clause is the text of the clause itself. Here one notices that the
word "commerce" governs three separate sets of relations-those
with foreign nations, among the states, and with Indian tribes. 13
One should assume that the word commerce applies with equal
force to all three cases, and bears the same meaning with respect
to each of its objects. One cannot, for example, assign a meaning to
"commerce" which is intelligible only with respect to foreign na-
tions. The asserted construction must make equally good sense for
commerce among the states and for commerce with the Indian
tribes.
Similarly, one does not want a meaning of the term commerce
which renders any one of these three heads of the commerce power
redundant or unnecessary. The modern view which says that com-
merce among the several states includes all manufacture and other
productive activity within each and every state, because of the ef-
fect that such manufacture has upon commerce, violates this con-
straint. If commerce includes all that precedes trade with foreign
nations, among the states, and with Indian tribes, then the three
heads of jurisdiction cover the same ground; that is, each by itself
covers manufacturing or agriculture within each of the states. The
" It is no coincidence, for example, that West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upholding minimum wage law for women), was decided in the same term as NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), discussed infra notes 185-202 and accom-
panying text.
"f See, e.g., Cohen, The Inevitable Constitutional Revolution of 1937 (speech to the AALS
Constitutional Law Meeting, Washington, D.C., Oct. 8, 1987), written in response to my
short paper, R. Epstein, Why the Revolution of 1937 Was a Mistake. Cohen places heavy
reliance upon the Roosevelt landslide of 1936 as justification for the expanded construction
of the commerce clause.
11 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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scope of the clause would thus be plenary even if it said only that
Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, or even with the Indian tribes, and remained silent about
commerce among the several states. The level of industrial produc-
tion within each state, after all, influences the amount, type, and
price of goods available for the export trade or for the Indian
trade. Granting Congress the power over commerce among the
states thus accomplishes nothing that has not been already pro-
vided for elsewhere in the document. What possible sense does it
make as a matter of ordinary English to say that Congress can reg-
ulate "manufacturing with foreign nations, or with Indian tribes,"
or for that matter "manufacturing among the several states," when
the particular fabrication or production takes place in one state,
even with goods purchased from another?
Taking the alternative position, that commerce means trade, or
as Chief Justice Marshall said, "intercourse,"14 with or among the
parties named, changes the situation dramatically. By Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's account, "intercourse" covered both shipping and
navigation, and the contracts regulating buying and selling. Using
that two-part definition it becomes clear that trade with foreign
nations is not trade among the several states or with the Indian
tribes. Each part of the clause attributes the same meaning to the
term commerce, and each of the objects of the clause-foreign na-
tions, the states, and Indian tribes-becomes an indispensable part
of the constitutional structure. The power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, for example, is needed to ensure that trade
negotiations with foreign nations are not conducted by each of the
" Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824). Chief Justice Marshall continued:
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It de-
scribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The
mind can scarcely conceive of a system for regulating commerce between nations,
which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admis-
sion of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to
prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying
and selling, or of barter.
Id. at 189-90. Chief Justice Marshall may well have borrowed the term "intercourse" from
Hamilton, who in speaking of "The importance of the Union, in a commercial light," also
spoke of "our intercourse with foreign countries as well as with each other." The Federalist
No. 11, at 62 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library College ed. 1937). Note too that in The Feder-
alist No. 11, Hamilton repeatedly stressed that navigation was comprehended in commerce,
the very point that Chief Justice Marshall had emphasized in his decision.
1394 [Vol. 73:1387
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several states in its own individual capacity.15
It is worth noting that this view of commerce as trade is consis-
tent with the other prominent mention of the word commerce in
the Constitution. Article I also states that "[nlo preference shall be
given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of
one State over those of another .. ". . I' The term "commerce" is
used in opposition to the term "revenue," and seems clearly to re-
fer to shipping and its incidental activities; this much seems evi-
dent from the use of the term "port." The clause itself would
sound odd if it referred, for example, to preferences "given by any
Regulation of Commerce, Manufacture or Revenue to the ports of
one State." The term commerce in this commerce provision does
not carry with it the extensive baggage placed upon it by the bet-
ter-known New Deal cases concerning the commerce clause.
III. THE STRUCTURE
One obtains the same interpretation of the commerce clause
when considering the clause in light of the overall constitutional
structure. Article I, section 8, contains an extensive list of separate,
discrete, and enumerated powers granted to Congress, whereas ar-
ticle I, section 9, contains a comparable list of powers specifically
denied to it. The lists of inclusion and exclusion suggest that the
provisions contained in any one section should be read to recognize
the existence and necessity of other specific powers and limitations
contained elsewhere in article I, as well as the certainty that some
matters are wholly beyond the power of Congress.
This view certainly appears to agree with the original theory of
the Constitution. The federal government received delegated pow-
ers from the states and the individuals within the states. The exact
source of the granting power might be somewhat unclear; after all,
the preamble begins with "We the People, ' 17 yet ratification was
by nine of the thirteen sovereign states.'8 Yet whatever the pedi-
"I This point was stressed by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 11, as in the sentence
quoted supra note 5. For those of us who believe in free trade, the powers given Congress
seem far too broad, as the debates over the current protectionist trade bills reveal. See also
Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in Regulation, Federalism, and Inter-
state Commerce 16, 51 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981).
16 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
17 Id. preamble.
19 See id. art. VII.
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gree of the Constitution, there was clearly no sense that either
grantor conferred upon the Congress the plenary power to act as a
roving commission, in order to do whatever it thought best for the
common good. The looseness of vague grants of power would have
given rise to the possibility of massive abuse, a possibility the
framers seemed determined to control. The federal government
was to have supremacy in the areas under its control, but the quid
pro quo was that these areas were to be limited by specific jurisdic-
tional grants. A system which says that the commerce clause essen-
tially allows the government to regulate anything that even indi-
rectly burdens or affects commerce does away with the key
understanding that the federal government has received only enu-
merated powers. The doctrine of "internal relations" is not only a
philosophidal creed that says every event is related to every other
separate event; it is also something of an economic truth in a world
in which the price of any given commodity depends upon the costs
of its inputs and upon the alternatives available to potential buy-
ers. To say that Congress may regulate X because of its price ef-
fects upon any goods in interstate commerce, or because of its ef-
fects upon the quantity of goods so shipped, is to say that Congress
can regulate whatever it pleases, a theory that cases such as Wick-
ard v. Filburn19 have so eagerly inferred.
On this score, moreover, there is no reason to distinguish the
commerce of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from that of
the twentieth. Business in one state has always had profound eco-
nomic effects upon the fortunes of other states. The pre-Civil War
battles between North and South over the tariff show just how
much the fate of each state has always depended upon national
economic policies.20 There was no economic revolution during the
Progressive Era or the New Deal that justifies the convenient es-
cape of saying that it is only the nature of business and trade that
has changed, not the appropriate construction of the commerce
clause.21 The intimate interdependence between trade and national
19 317 U.S. 111 (1942). For further elaboration, see infra notes 221-26 and accompanying
text.
20 See S. Morrison, H. Commager & W. Leutchenburg, A Concise History of the American
Republic 188-91 (1977).
1 See, for one illustration of this escape, a superb new casebook:
The Civil War and its aftermath inaugurated an era in which Congress began to act
more vigorously. The very success of the national economy created problems. The
1396 [Vol. 73:1387
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economic conditions was as clear to the Phoenicians and the Ro-
mans as it is to ourselves. There has been no basic transformation
of the economy that requires, or allows, a parallel transformation
in the scope of the commerce clause. International trade is driven
by the principle of comparative advantage and the costs of reach-
ing distant markets. It did not begin with either the steamship or
the railroad.
If the constitutional limitations on federal powers were designed
to act as a substitute Bill of Rights, then the expansive interpreta-
tion of the commerce clause has done away with this protection
completely. The necessary effect is that greater burdens are placed
upon the substantive limitations, such as the Bill of Rights, found
elsewhere in the Constitution. These limitations have met with
varying fates themselves; one need only contrast the takings clause
of the fifth amendment with the first amendment protection of the
freedom of speech. In some cases, the second barrier against ex-
panded government has held. In other cases, chiefly those concern-
ing economic liberties, it has crumbled, leaving liberty at the
mercy of the "good faith" of the Congress whose mischief the bar-
rier was designed to constrain.
Nor is any of this understanding upset by the "necessary and
proper" clause of the Constitution, which may expand the power of
Congress, but does not provide for an unlimited grant of federal
power. The necessary and proper clause provides that Congress
shall have the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."22 As
drafted the clause does nothing to upset the balance of power be-
tween the federal and the state governments, nor to contravene the
principle of enumerated powers on which the structure of article I,
section 8 rests. What the necessary and proper clause does is to
ensure that the Congress shall have all means at its disposal to
reach the heads of power that admittedly fall within its grasp.
economy became obviously interconnected; problems were no longer localized, so that
it became difficult to imagine a purely internal commerce that affected no other
states.
G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 138 (1986).
22 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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Such is the import of the phrase "for carrying into Execution":
Congress shall not fail because it lacks the means of implementa-
tion. The clause does not, however, authorize the creation of new
and independent heads of power, such as over local manufacture or
agriculture, that obliterate the distinction between a federal and a
national government. The necessary and proper clause thus per-
mits the regulation of local affairs that are in a sense inseparable
from national ones, as happens when local and interstate cars, for
example, move along the same line.23 But it is hardly "necessary"
to regulate every form of local activity in order to regulate the
three heads of commerce over which Congress has power. And it is
surely not "proper" to do so.2 4
This reading of the necessary and proper clause may appear
somewhat narrower than that given by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitu-
tion, are constitutional." 5 Yet as stated, Chief Justice Marshall's
broad reading of the clause does take into account the risks of
overinclusion, by reference to matters which "consist with the let-
ter and spirit of the constitution," which surely includes respect
for the principle of enumerated powers, which Chief Justice Mar-
shall acknowledged as being preserved in the tenth amendment.26
More to the point, Chief Justice Marshall adopted just this limited
interpretation of "necessary and proper" in Gibbons v. Ogden
when he wrote: "In the last of the enumerated powers, that which
23 See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
24 See The Federalist No. 33, in which Hamilton gives a relatively narrow reading of the
necessary and proper clause, when he tries to allay the fear that the necessary and proper
clause will allow the national government to run roughshod over the states:
But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is, that it could
only have been done for greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refinements
in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate
authorities of the Union.
The Federalist No. 33, at 200 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library College ed. 1937). In the
subsequent dispute over the clause in connection with the creation of a national bank, Ham-
ilton gave a broader interpretation, similar to that put forward by Chief Justice Marshall.
See D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-
1888, at 160-69.
25 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
26 Id. at 406.
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grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution,
Congress is authorized 'to make laws which shall be necessary and
proper' for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which
may be used, is not extended to the powers which are conferred."2
In essence he treats the clause as a limitation upon means only,
and surely not as an extension of permitted ends. So understood,
the necessary and proper clause places a small but important
weight upon the jurisdictional scales. But it is far from an auto-
matic trump that overrides other jurisdictional limitations. Its his-
torical role in the explication of the commerce clause is relatively
small, and deservedly So.2 8
IV. THE CASE LAW BEFORE THE NEW DEAL: 1824-1936
The elaborate case law under the commerce clause can be profit-
ably interpreted in light of the above understandings. Thus it is
often said today that the New Deal does not represent violent
revolution but prudent reformation 9 (one thinks of Martin Luther
and that other reformation). More precisely, the newer cases are
said only to have returned to the wisdom of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, who understood the importance of an expansive interpreta-
tion of the commerce clause to the maintenance of the Union.3 0 In
between, in such cases as United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,31 the
courts are said to have strayed from the original understanding to
a view that effectively hampered the power of Congress to impose
much-needed social and economic regulation. This set of insights
has even been dressed up in plausible philosophical garb. Professor
Tribe's treatise, American Constitutional Law, tells us that the
Supreme Court between 1887 and 1937 substituted a "formal clas-
27 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824). Note too that Chief Justice Mar-
shall addressed the necessary and proper clause in order to show that it does not require a
rule of strict construction.
28 Thus Professor Tribe gives but one brief connection between the two clauses, where
they are discussed in connection with the so-called protective principle, which allows Con-
gress to reach matters outside the scope of the commerce clause in order to govern those
matters that fall within it. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-7, at 240 (1978).
The threat this principle poses to the doctrine of enumerated powers is ignored by Professor
Tribe, but is discussed herein. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., L. Tribe, supra note 28, § 5-4, at 232-35.
20 See id.
-1 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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sification" of economic activities for the "empiricism" 32 that char-
acterized Chief Justice Marshall's great judgment in the pivotal
case of Gibbons v. Ogden.'3
The New Deal was not a reformation, but a sharp departure
from previous case law, and one that moved federal power far be-
yond anything Chief Justice Marshall had in mind. Gibbons is
often regarded as an expansive interpretation, and for its time so it
was. Yet when the critical passages of the opinion are read as a
whole, it seems quite clear that the case strongly adumbrated the
subsequent holding in E.C. Knight, with which it is said to con-
trast so clearly. It is worth a minute to describe Chief Justice Mar-
shall's logic, for the key to understanding his view is to understand
that he found in the rigid and formal structures of the Constitu-
tion the materials that enabled it to be the foundation on which a
perpetual Union could rest. His vision of the Constitution was not
that of a living and changing organism, but of a great temple of
government that, properly understood, could endure for the ages.3 4
2' L. Tribe, supra note 28, § 5-4, at 234-35. He continued: "But with its watershed deci-
sion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. [301 U.S. 1 (1937)], the Court acceded to
political pressure and to its own sense of its doctrine's irrelevance and manipulability, aban-
doning the formally analytical approach to the commerce clause, and returning to Chief
Justice Marshall's original empiricism." Id. at 235. Professor Tribe was not the first to de-
velop this line of thought. It was documented in great detail in Stern, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645 (1946), a highly readable and
happily partisan defense of the New Deal decisions written by a member of the Solicitor
General's office, who had participated actively on the government's side.
" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
'" See Chief Justice Marshall's discussion in McCulloch, where his famous phrase, "we
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding," was designed to show only
the opposition between a document which spoke in great outlines and the detailed positions
of, say, a commercial code. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). See
also his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dis-
senting), where his argument for the prospective application of the contract clause rested in
part on his vision that individuals preserve in civil society the rights to contract that they
have in the state of nature. Id. at 345-49. Chief Justice Marshall also wrote:
In framing an instrument, which was intended to be perpetual, the presumption is
strong, that every important principle introduced into it is intended to be perpetual
also; that a principle expressed in terms to operate in all future time, is intended so
to operate. But if the construction for which the plaintiff's counsel contend be the
true one (i.e. retroactive legislation only], the constitution will have imposed a restric-
tion in language indicating perpetuity, which every State in the Union may elude at
pleasure. The obligation of contracts in force, at any given time, is but of short dura-
tion; and, if the inhibition be of retroactive laws only, a very short lapse of time will
remove every subject on which the act is forbidden to operate, and make this provi-
sion of the constitution so far useless.
1400
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A. Gibbons v. Ogden
At issue in Gibbons v. Ogden was whether New York could grant
an exclusive franchise that permitted steamships to ply between
New Jersey and New York only with the franchisees' permission. 5
New Jersey had passed a retaliatory law; citizens of New Jersey
sued in New York for violating New York law could recoup treble
damages against the New Yorker in a New Jersey court.3 " The New
York statute threatened massive commercial balkanization.3 7 Chief
Justice Marshall decided, first, that navigation among the several
states was interstate commerce, and second (in order to avoid the
question of whether any dormant commerce power could be identi-
fied) that a 1793 federal statute that licensed ships in the "coast-
ing trade" had preempted the New York statute."8
Professor Tribe has summarized his view of the broad scope of
Gibbons as follows:
[I]n an elaborate preliminary discussion, [Chief Justice] Marshall
indicated that, in his view, congressional power to regulate "com-
Id. at 355.
It is at least a little ironic that Chief Justice Hughes refers to the Chief Justice Marshall
of McCulloch in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934), while
ignoring the Chief Justice Marshall of Ogden.
I have given a modified defense of Chief Justice Marshall's position in Epstein, Toward a
Revitalization of the Commerce Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 723-30 (1984). For criticism,
see Kmiec & McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14
Hastings Const. L.Q. 525, 557-59 (1987).
15 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 1-2 (1824). Ogden was the assignee of the
original franchisees, Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton.
11 Id. at 4-5 (argument of Daniel Webster for appellant).
" Also at issue was whether the exclusive franchise was an impairment of contract by the
state of New York. The conclusion that it was would seem quite plausible if the contracts
clause was given the prospective interpretation that Chief Justice Marshall urged three
years after Gibbons. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-56 (1827) (Mar-
shall, C.J., dissenting). But Chief Justice Marshall was in dissent in Saunders and the inter-
pretation was lost. One might also note that Gibbons involved the conversion of public prop-
erty (to which access is open and equal) to private property. It was a taking, albeit of public
and not private property. The public trust issue surfaced in Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9
Johns. 507, 572-573 (N.Y. 1812), in which New York Chief Justice Kent brushed aside the
argument there was an impropriety in the grant under state law doctrine. On the vexing use
of the public trust doctrine, see Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Rose,
The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property, 53 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 711 (1986); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970). For my views, see Epstein, The Public
Trust Doctrine, 7 Cato J. (forthcoming 1987).
" Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 190-91, 213-17.
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mercial intercourse" extended to all activity having any interstate
impact-however indirect. Acting under the commerce clause, Con-
gress could legislate with respect to all "commerce which concerns
more states than one." This power would be plenary: absolute
within its sphere, subject only to the Constitution's affirmative
prohibitions on the exercise of federal authority. 9
This passage suggests that Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons
gave a very extensive reading to the reach of the commerce clause.
But that is only because of the redactor's power of selection. Con-
sider the fuller context of the quotation from Gibbons:
Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary
line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that com-
merce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between
man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same
State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a
power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one.
The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to
indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not
an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the partic-
ular classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended,
would not have been made, had the intention been to extend the
power to every description. The enumeration presupposes some-
thing not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the lan-
guage or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively inter-
nal commerce of a State.40
The passage gives a quite different sense of the commerce
clause's scope than the one that Tribe suggests. It is hard to find
in the phrase "commerce which concerns more States than one" a
total jurisdiction over all commercial activity, especially when the
phrase is preceded by the word "restricted."' 4 1 Quite the opposite;
:9 L. Tribe, supra note 28, § 5-4, at 232 (footnotes omitted).
40 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195 (emphasis added).
4" Id. Stern used the same selective powers of quotation, stating that "the Commerce
Clause comprehended 'that commerce which concerns more states than one.'" Stern, supra
note 32, at 648 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95. He then dropped the rest of the mate-
rial quoted above and continued with the remainder of the passage, beginning "[tihe genius
and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the
external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the states gener-
1402 [Vol. 73:1387
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it looks as though Chief Justice Marshall wanted only to refute the
argument (see his first sentence quoted) that interstate commerce
can only take place on the narrow boundary between the two
states.42 Such a position, if carried into law, would have rendered
the commerce clause a dead letter. Commerce between two states,
or among many, must take place physically within the confines of
one or both of them. It is therefore the nature of a transaction,
rather than its location, that stamps it as part of interstate com-
merce. Navigation between states takes place at one instant in one
state, and at another instant in another. Both portions of the jour-
ney are covered by the commerce clause, even if purely intrastate
navigation is excluded. The power may be plenary, but it is surely
limited as to its objects. Matters outside its scope are fully re-
served to the states. Chief Justice Marshall did write, as Tribe sug-
gests, of the "plenary" nature of the commerce power. But again
his words must be set in context. Chief Justice Marshall thus
wrote: "This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete
in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution. ' 4 But
he continued:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects,
the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the sev-
eral states, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a
single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions
on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the
United States.44
It follows therefore that "plenary" powers were understood by
ally." Id. The passage reads more broadly without the omitted language.
42 Marshall emphasized this point elsewhere in Gibbons:
But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not
stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power,
if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign na-
tions, is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it.
The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction, pass through the
interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this
right.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195. Note that Marshall assigned to commerce a uniform meaning with
regard both to commerce with foreign nations and to that among the several states.
3 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
1, Id. at 197.
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Chief Justice Marshall to be wholly consistent with powers "lim-
ited to specified objects."
This view is, moreover, reinforced when we take into account
Chief Justice Marshall's own principles of construction, which
should give caution to advocates of both judicial restraint and judi-
cial activism. His attitude was essentially that the Constitution
should be construed in its "natural sense." He was rightly suspi-
cious of any effort to impose principles of "strict construction,"
but by the same token did not wish to give words an extravagant
meaning given their function and purpose within the framework of
the constitution. 45 He followed a middle course on the issue of con-
struction, that of ordinary meaning, no different from that which a
good contracts judge follows when he attaches ordinary meaning to
contractual provisions.46 Even with an explicit reference to the
necessary and proper clause,47 Chief Justice Marshall acknowl-
edged that the commerce clause was itself directed toward specific
ends, as was captured by the distinction between "internal" and
"external" commerce, where internal commerce was that trade
"between man and man in a State, or between different parts of
the same State. '48 By that definition internal commerce is as com-
monplace in our own time as it was in Marshall's: every purchase
4' Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
What do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend only against that
enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious
import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the
principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some
theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those pow-
ers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consis-
tent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construc-
tion, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for
which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly under-
stood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict con-
struction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded.
Id. at 188.
48 Farnsworth writes: "An especially common rule of construction is that if language sup-
plied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations, one of which favors each
party, the one that is less favorable to the party who supplied the language is preferred." E.
Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.11, at 499 (1982). The rule is widely used with standard form
contracts, and even beyond them. Its major cost is that it biases the way in which the origi-
nal documents are drafted, rendering them more complicated and less clear than they would
under a rule of ordinary and natural meaning, without the presumption.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187; see supra notes 22-28 for a discussion of the clause.
48 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
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at a supermarket is internal commerce, even if the market itself
acquired its own goods from a supplier out of state.
Nor is this balance between internal and external commerce un-
done because Chief Justice Marshall used the word "affects" to
round out the scope of Congress' power. Those references to activi-
ties that "affect" interstate commerce cannot be read in isolation
from the rest of the text, as an effort to nullify the basic doctrine
of enumerated powers. Instead, his purpose was to counter prior
contentions about the scope of internal commerce that had been
stated by the New York court in Livingston v. Van Ingen.49 There,
New York Chief Justice Kent gave the commerce clause its nar-
rowest possible construction, and thus treated as part of internal
commerce any portion of an interstate journey that was under-
taken wholly within local waters.50 When Chief Justice Marshall
spoke of local regulations that "affect" interstate commerce, he did
so to reject the argument that New York could insist that all rival
carriers be required to use sails in New York waters, even if they
used steam elsewhere. So long as this local restriction "affected"
the journey as a whole, the regulation reached commerce among
the several states, notwithstanding that its "direct" impact was on
New York waters alone. There is not the slightest hint that Chief
Justice Marshall meant to have the "affects" qualification expand
the specific objects to which the "plenary" commerce clause ap-
plies, beyond the control of interstate commercial transactions and
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
Further elaboration of Chief Justice Marshall's meaning ap-
peared elsewhere in his opinion. At one point he addressed
whether the states could pass inspection laws, or whether these
laws fell solely within the domain of the congressional commerce
power.51 He finessed that question by giving a very narrow defini-
tion of what interstate commerce included:
11 9 Johns. 506 (N.Y. 1812).
5o New York Chief Justice Kent wrote:
Our turnpike roads, our toll-bridges, the exclusive grant to run stage-wagons, our laws
relating to paupers from other states, our Sunday laws, our rights of ferriage over
navigable rivers and lakes, our auction licenses, our licences to retail spiritous liquors,
the laws to restrain hawkers and pedlars; what are all these provisions but regulations
of internal commerce, affecting as well the intercourse between the citizens of this
and other states, as between our own citizens.
Id. at 579.
" See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203.
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That inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influ-
ence on commerce, will not be denied; but that a power to regulate
commerce is the source from which the right to pass them is de-
rived, cannot be admitted. The object of inspection laws, is to im-
prove the quality of articles produced by the labour of a country;
to fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic use. They
act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign com-
merce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that
purpose.2
It is instructive to compare this passage with the most famous
sentence of E.C. Knight, which has been cited as a sign of its nar-
row and indefensible rigidity: "Commerce succeeds to manufac-
ture, and is not a part of it."'53 Chief Justice Marshall himself could
have written that sentence, citing Gibbons as authority. His style
was anything but "empirical," if that term is used to identify the
necessary economic connection between intrastate and interstate
commerce. Indeed the passage just quoted is wholly inconsistent
with the indirect burden on interstate commerce approach taken in
the modern law. Chief Justice Marshall's greatness rests upon his
appreciation of the boundaries which should dominate the consti-
tutional playing field. Individual cases may fall close to the bound-
ary lines, and must be placed on one side or the other. Yet the
position of the boundary lines must remain fixed if the power to
adjudicate is to remain. Things cannot be partly in and partly out
of interstate commerce. As long as one government or the other
must regulate, the boundaries must be sharp-such as the foul
lines in baseball-and not fuzzy. It has been said that modern con-
stitutional law represents the triumph of "formalism" over "real-
ism."54 If this is true, then Chief Justice Marshall was the great
formalist, not the precursor of the modern realists.
There is a good deal to be said for Marshall's categorical ap-
proach. If pressed to give a common law analogy to Marshall's way
of thinking, I would offer the common law trilogy of the liabilities
52 Id.
51 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
51 One new casebook states: "Under the formal approach, the Court examines the statute
and the regulated activity to determine whether certain objective criteria are satisfied. ...
In contrast, the realist approach attempts to determine the actual economic impact of the
regulation or the actual motivation of Congress." G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M.
Tushnet, supra note 21, at 139.
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of a landowner to the trespasser, the licensee, and the invitee. No
judge ever thought that these categories were crystal clear, nor that
individual cases would not give rise to honest disagreements of
opinion. But it was thought that the categories were fixed and lim-
ited as a matter of principle: "There is no half-way house, no no-
man's land between adjacent territories. When I say rigid, I mean
rigid in law."' 55 And the modern disintegration of the categories has
done little to produce any coherent law of occupiers' liability. 56 So
it is with interstate commerce. The principle that the power of
Congress did not extend to the internal commerce of the state was
as important to the overall scheme as the recognition that the
power of Congress extended to interstate commerce. Marshall well
understood the fact that local events affected interstate commerce,
but he rejected it as a basis for extension of congressional power
over internal matters. Gibbons thus stands in sharp opposition to
the very assertion of federal power that characterizes such cases as
United States v. Darby57 and Wickard v. Filburn.5 8 In Wickard,
5' Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, 1929 App. Cas. 358, 371 (H.L.).
The passage continues:
When you come to the facts it may well be that there is great difficulty-such diffi-
culty as may give rise to difference of judicial opinion-in deciding into which cate-
gory a particular case falls, but a judge must decide and, having decided, then the law
of that category will rule and there must be no looking to the law of the adjoining
category. I cannot help thinking that the use of epithets, "bare licensees," "pure tres-
passers" and so on, has much to answer for in obscuring what I think is a vital pro-
position; that, in deciding cases of the class we are considering, the first duty of the
tribunal is to fix once and for all into which of the three classes the person in ques-
tion falls.
Id. at 371-72.
" The key case is still Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968). Rowland was in a sense wholly gratuitous, as recovery could have been awarded
under the traditional view holding hosts responsible for latent defects causing harm under
ordinary usage. See id. at 115, 443 P.2d at 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102. For a criticism of the
modern tendency of balancing in the tort area, see Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 47
Ohio St. L.J. (forthcoming 1987).
7 312 U.S. 100 (1941); see discussion infra notes 206-17 and accompanying text. Note too
that Darby's view of the clause makes hash of the reserved powers clause of the tenth
amendment. If jurisdiction under the commerce clause is both plenary and unlimited, then
there is nothing left to reserve. The tenth amendment thus really becomes a truism. Yet the
amendment sharply confirms that the federal government has only delegated powers: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. Why
bother with the amendment if Darby is correct? By contrast, the tenth amendment makes
good sense if Chief Justice Marshall's view in Gibbons is followed.
5 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see discussion infra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
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Justice Jackson captured the transformation of Gibbons when he
wrote: "At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the fed-
eral commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded."59 No
way.
B. The Expansion of Commerce Clause Jurisdiction
There is a long road from Gibbons to modern doctrine of the
broad reach of congressional power under the commerce clause.
This section will trace the twists and turns in that road. In one
sense Gibbons, for all its importance, is an odd place from which to
begin the journey, because the case itself as much concerned the
limitation of state power as it did the extent of congressional
power under the coastal trading statute. Indeed, the negative, or
dormant, commerce clause power that prohibits states from intrud-
ing on the federal authority over interstate commerce even absent
any congressional legislation on the subject of the state action
dates from Gibbons as well; Justice Johnson's concurring opinion
argued that the commerce clause standing alone prohibited New
York from passing the statute in question.60 The primary purpose
11 Id. at 120. Justice Jackson went on to note that Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons
warned that "effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather than
from judicial processes." Id. The passage in Gibbons reads in full:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other
instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they
have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the peo-
ple must often rely solely, in all representative goyernments.
The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every
State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with
"commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian
tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New-York, and act
upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197. Justice Jackson thus confused two points. First, the
need for political decisions for matters properly within the scope of the commerce powers,
and, second, the scope of the clause itself. The latter was only held to "comprehend naviga-
tion" in New York waters, not all productive activities within the state.
10 Justice Johnson wrote:
The power of a sovereign state over commerce, therefore, amounts to nothing more
than a power to limit and restrain it at pleasure. And since the power to prescribe the
limits to its freedom, necessarily implies the power to determine what shall remain
unrestrained, it follows, that the power must be exclusive; it can reside but in one
potentate; and hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving
nothing for the State to act upon.
1408
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of this Article is not, however, to trace the negative side of the
clause,6' which has proven quite stable in recent times. Rather, the
purpose is to follow the expansion of the affirmative power of the
clause. This development took place along three separate lines.2
The first line took its cue from the narrow holding of Gibbons that
navigation counted as commerce under the clause, and concerned
the "instrumentalities of commerce." This Article follows the ex-
pansion of the clause, briefly in connection with navigable water-
It is impossible, with the views which I entertain of the principle on which the
commercial privileges of the people of the United States, among themselves, rests, to
concur in the view which this Court takes of the effect of the coasting license in this
cause. I do not regard it as the foundation of the right set up in behalf of the appel-
lant. . . . And I cannot overcome the conviction, that if the licensing act was re-
pealed to-morrow, the rights of the appellant to a reversal of the decision complained
of, would be as strong as it is under this license.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 227-32 (Johnson, J., concurring).
" It is strange to think of how little the commerce power moved in the decades that
followed Gibbons. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), stood for the
principle that the federal jurisdiction under the commerce clause comes in two parts. For
those matters, such as pilotage in local waters, that fall within interstate commerce but that
are of great local concern as well, the federal and state jurisdictions are concurrent. Id. at
319-20. For those matters for which there should be a uniform rule, the power of Congress is
exclusive. Id. at 319. This delicate compromise is somewhat tricky to reconcile with the
constitutional text, even if greater feats of legerdemain have been done in the name of con-
stitutional construction. The power granted by the commerce clause seems to be unitary for
all objects that fall within it; how then can federal jurisdiction be exclusive for some areas
and concurrent for others?
Nonetheless the Cooley solution does have a structural sense that makes it more durable
than might appear at first blush. Local conditions easily could demand separate treatments,
which do not threaten interstate commerce in the same way as did the New York statute at
issue in Gibbons. Local practices shown to discriminate against outsiders could be addressed
by the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution, and arguably by other substan-
tive provisions as well. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1
41 In analyzing this division, I do not discuss in depth United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 71 (1838), which upheld the constitutionality of a statute that imposed criminal
penalties against "any person who shall plunder, steal or destroy any money, goods," etc.
from a ship under the admirality jurisdiction of the United States. Justice Story sustained
the constitutionality of that statute, writing that the commerce clause "extends to such acts,
done on land, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise of the power to
regulate commerce and navigation with foreign nations and among the states." Id. at 78.
Note that there are actions outside of interstate commerce that have evident effects upon
interstate commerce. Yet the decision does little to threaten the system of enumuerated
powers found in the constitution, because the train of physical effects is quite limited, and
do not involve the federal government in the operations of the local economies. Coombs is
another case for which the necessary and proper clause could sensibly make the difference.
But, given its limited extent, it is not surprising that Coombs was not invoked in the subse-
quent expansionary period of the commerce clause.
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ways, and more extensively with the systematic and inexorable ex-
pansion of the federal power to regulate the railroads under the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, as amended. 3
The second line of cases involved the regulation of goods admit-
tedly in interstate commerce (that is, goods in transit across state
lines) in order to control the primary conduct of persons in either
the sending or receiving state. This line of cases might be called
the "indirect regulation" cases. The third line of cases, emanating
from E.C. Knight itself, explored the distinction between manufac-
ture and commerce among the several states.
Between 1870 and 1937 the scope of federal power under these
three lines of case law continued to expand, but in ways that still
left an extensive area of economic life outside the power of Con-
gress. In particular, the distinction between manufacture and com-
merce laid down in E.C. Knight in 1895 retained its validity until
it was at last overturned in 1937 by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.6 4 In general the expansion of the first and second
heads of the commerce power fall within the general scheme set
out by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons in that they address both
the power of Congress to regulate the means by which goods are
shipped in interstate commerce, as well as the types of goods that
can be shipped. In my judgment, the scope of the federal power
under these two heads moved, prior to 1937, a step or two beyond
where proper argument would take them. But although these diffi-
cult cases can be argued at the margin, nothing in the case law
under these two heads undermined the essential validity of the line
between commerce, on the one hand, and manufacture and agricul-
ture on the other, clearly adumbrated in Gibbons and accepted in
E.C. Knight. It is only when that last distinction is rejected that a
system of enumerated powers is dismantled. Yet there is no con-
ceptual necessity for saying that power to regulate commerce
among the several states must reach everything if it is to reach
anything. The modern generation of negative commerce clause
cases is instructive because it proves that it is possible, and sensi-
ble, to articulate an enduring conception of interstate com-
merce-just as Chief Justice Marshall had insisted.
63 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11917 (Supp.
1987)).
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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1. The Instrumentalities of Commerce
Gibbons itself laid down the distinction between the "internal
commerce" or "interior traffic" of a state and commerce among the
states.65 Although Chief Justice Marshall articulated the distinc-
tion with confident assurance, its limits were not really tested until
1870, when the Court in The Daniel Ball66 considered an 1852 in-
spection statute for steam passenger vessels operating on the navi-
gable waters of the United States. The appellant questioned
whether Congress had the power to inspect a ship that remained
solely within a single state, even though it carried goods that had
been shipped from other states, or were eventually destined for
shipment into other states.67 As framed, the case offered an in-
structive counterpoint to Gibbons, which had decided that the fed-
eral commerce power reached a single, continuous journey that
started in one state and ended in another. The Court in The
Daniel Ball asked what happened when that same journey in-
volved two ships instead of one. If Chief Justice Marshall's view of
the commerce clause was as expansive as the received wisdom has
it-if "plenary" had meant "wholly unbounded"-then it is
unintelligible why the Supreme Court should have paused a second
to decide The Daniel Ball. It is only because Gibbons extended the
scope of the commerce power to "intercourse," and kept it there,
that there was any occasion to deliberate on the loose ends left
open by Gibbons.
Relative to the understandings of its time, The Daniel Ball gave
Gibbons a modestly expansive interpretation. The opinion by Jus-
tice Field-no friend of big government-upheld the 1852 inspec-
tion statute because of the Court's explicit fear that any other in-
terpretation of the commerce clause would strip the federal
government of its fundamental powers. "Several agencies combin-
ing, each taking up the commodity transported at the boundary
line at one end of a State, and leaving it at the boundary line at
the other end," he wrote, "the Federal jurisdiction would be en-
tirely ousted, and the constitutional provision would become a
dead letter."68
" Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95.
66 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
'7 Id. at 562 (argument of appellant).
61 Id. at 566.
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Justice Field's conclusion has assumed the status of a necessary
truth. Nonetheless, there is reason to ask whether the decision is as
impregnable as it seems. It appears that the commerce clause
could well apply to goods destined for sale in another state as part
of a continuous transaction, even if they are shipped by boats that
operate solely within the territorial waters of one state. Where the
transfer of goods from boat to boat is part of a comprehensive
plan-as when the various carriers have coordinated travel sched-
ules-then Congress should have jurisdiction. But it is far from
self-evident that because the goods are in the interstate market the
ships which carry them on parts of the journey are in interstate
commerce as well. The states could regulate the safety of the boats
on which the goods are carried, while the federal government could
(as it has never seen fit to do) pass a statute dealing with the
rights and duties of common carriers and their customers, as well
as maintain jurisdiction over any ship that did cross a state line.
There need be no gap in the system of regulation. And as long as
ships remain within a single state, shipowners hardly need the fed-
eral power to protect them from inconsistent regulation. If state
regulation became overly onerous, a shipowner could escape it by
explicitly organizing his business to specialize in interstate trans-
port, or by moving to another state. Deciding The Daniel Ball the
other way would have promoted competition between state govern-
ments. Such an outcome would hardly have made the commerce
clause a dead letter, as Justice Field insisted, even if it would have
stopped the further expansion of federal power.
There is a danger in this alternative analysis of The Daniel Ball
that federal jurisdiction will be less comprehensive than is needed
to perform a particular regulatory task. The Court in The Daniel
Ball and subsequent decisions reacted to this danger by weighing
the risk of underinclusion within the federal power more heavily
than the reverse danger of overinclusion. With the vantage of hind-
sight, The Daniel Ball originated the "protective principle" which,
when pushed to its limit, finds that the use of federal power in a
doubtful case is always "necessary," perhaps in the sense of the
"necessary and proper" clause. 9 But there are some risks to the
strategy, that although not evident here, must be kept in mind.
Unless the countervailing principle of enumerated powers is
'9 See infra notes 22-28; L. Tribe, supra note 28, § 5-6, at 238-39.
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brought to the fore, then the basic structure may be lost in a series
of small accretions, each one palatable on its own, even though the
whole structure is not.
It is precisely that form of incrementalism that characterized the
later cases involving the use of railroads in interstate commerce.
The impetus for national regulation clearly came from the famous
decision in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois.7 0 That
case prevented state governments from regulating railroad fares
from points within a state to points outside it."1 There was a func-
tional reason for the decision, given the risk that separate states
could impose inconsistent obligations upon carriers. Congress at-
tempted to solve this problem by passing the Interstate Commerce
Act (ICA)71 in 1887.
Sensible economic concerns led to the passage of the first ICA,
which was designed to prevent discrimination against short-haul
carriers. The problem arose because of the structure of the railroad
lines. Different carriers went by different routes from one popula-
tion center to another. Thus there was competition on the long-
haul routes (such as San Francisco to Chicago) because shippers
had many choices. But, once out in the plains, any given line had a
local monopoly that it could exploit against farmers and others.
When it exacted monopoly profit, its short-haul rates could easily
exceed its long-haul rates, even if the actual cost of long-haul ship-
ment was greater. But simply preventing the price per segment
from exceeding the price for the whole trip would have gone a long
70 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
71 Id. at 577.
72 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11917 (Supp.
1987)). Section 4 of the statute provided:
That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act
to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation
of passengers or of like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances
and conditions, for shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same
direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but this shall not be
construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this act to charge
and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance.
Id. § 4, 24 Stat. at 380.
A proviso to the section then gave the ICC the power to relieve carriers from this obliga-
tion "in special cases," but did not set out any standards which indicated when this general
obligation should be suspended, and none are apparent as a general matter. Section 3 of the
Act contained a prohibition against undue preferences, and § 5 prevented certain kinds of
pooling of freight.
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way toward eliminating monopoly profit without getting the gov-
ernment involved in the ratemaking that characterized the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC) after the "reforms" of this cen-
tury, including the Transportation Act of 1920.11
One question was whether the ICC's authority reached trips that
began and ended within a single state. In essence this was the
land-based version of the question raised, and answered in the af-
firmative, in The Daniel Ball. Nonetheless, as a matter of first
principle, one could forcefully insist that the proper answer should
have been no. The obvious response to this assertion is that un-
principled exploitation of short-haul users would have continued
on a limited scale even after the passage of the ICA. But that need
not have been the case. The states could have had exclusive juris-
diction over these short-haul runs, and their local laws could have
replicated the key substantive provision of the ICA, thereby pro-
tecting purely intrastate shippers: the railroad could not charge
more for the intrastate run than it charged for any longer inter-
state run of which the intrastate segment was a part. The danger
of radical state restrictions on the power of carriers to cover their
costs for internal runs could have been avoided by constitutional
protections against confiscation, such as those invoked during this
period in Smyth v. Ames. 4 The jurisdictional balance between fed-
eral and state governments could have been quite stable if left
where Gibbons had placed it. More to the point, Gibbons' limits on
the extent of the commerce clause would have been important be-
cause they would have limited the degree to which Congress could
have used its commerce power to cartelize the entire railroad in-
dustry, as it did by amending the ICA after World War I.75
Historically, however, the dividing line between interstate and
intrastate journeys did not endure. It is instructive to trace the
expansion of the commerce clause in the railroad cases. At each
point the Supreme Court seemed aware that there must be some
" Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (current version at scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1987)); see infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. For a general
account of the early changes in the Interstate Commerce Act, see Aitchison, The Evolution
of the Interstate Commerce Act: 1887-1937, 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 289 (1937).
74 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (holding state railroad regulations to be violations of the 14th
amendment).
71 See Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (current version at scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1987)).
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limit to the commerce power, but on virtually every occasion it
found the federal legislation at issue not to exceed the limit. The
Court failed to understand that too much federal jurisdiction was
as dangerous as too little. In this regard, Houston, East & West
Texas Railway v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 6 de-
cided in 1914, marked an especially instructive watershed. This
case has been read as an important step forward (the bias is im-
plicit) for the commerce power. The facts were complicated, and
the details have unfortunately been forgotten in modern times.
Nonetheless they deserve close attention today.
Various points in East Texas were served by interstate carriers
operating out of Shreveport, Louisiana on one end, and Dallas and
Houston, Texas on the other.7 Before the intercession of the ICC,
the prices charged by these railroad lines were far higher for ship-
ping goods from Shreveport to Texas than were the rates for ship-
ping goods within Texas, where rates were set by a state body, the
Texas Railroad Commission. 78 The ICC ordered adjustments to
railroad rate structures that "unjustly discriminated in favor of
traffic within the State of Texas and against similar traffic be-
tween Louisiana and Texas. '7 9
The ICC proposed a compound remedy to alleviate the perceived
ills. The first part of the ICC order imposed specific maximum
rates that the carriers could charge on their interstate, i.e., Louisi-
ana-Texas, routes.8 0 The second part was a general nondiscrimina-
tion provision which held that the rates in interstate traffic could
not be higher than those in intrastate traffic.8' The order, however,
left it to the railroads to decide whether they raised intrastate
rates, lowered interstate ones, or did a little of both. All that was
required was equalization of rates within the ceilings set by the
first part of the ICC order. Given the structure of the order, it was
possible for the railroads to comply in full with the ICC order
76 234 U.S. 342 (1914). I am most indebted to Professor Edmund Kitch for pointing out to
me the genuine complexities that this case raises, and for insisting that I deal more fully
with the matter.
7 Id. at 346.
78 Id.
71 Id. at 345. One example of the discrimination was that "a rate of 60 cents carried first
class traffic a distance of 160 miles to the eastward from Dallas, while the same rate would
carry the same class of traffic only 55 miles into Texas from Shreveport." Id. at 346.
80 Id. at 346-47.
0' Id. at 347.
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without changing their intrastate rates: the railroads simply had to
reduce their interstate rates until they equalled the rates charged
on the intrastate runs. Accordingly, the decision upholding the ICC
order could be read not to involve a conflict between the rates es-
tablished by the ICC for interstate traffic and those set by the
Texas Railroad Commission for intrastate traffic, and as such the
decision does not appear to have extended the scope of the com-
merce clause very far.
This narrow reading of the case, however, is belied in at least
two respects. First, the Shreveport Rate Case protected the rail-
roads if they chose to raise their intrastate rates in defiance of the
rates set by the Texas Railroad Commission. Although there was
no necessary regulation of intrastate rates, the remedy envisioned
made the state powerless to set any intrastate maximum below the
ICC maximum if the railroads chose to raise their local rates to the
ICC levels. The unmistakable thrust of the opinion was to make
the congressional power paramount over state authority:
Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are
so related that the government of the one involves the control of
the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to pre-
scribe the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would
be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority and the State,
and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field.82
Second, the Shreveport Rate Case relied upon and extended ear-
lier decisions that had sustained the power of Congress to regulate
railroad safety, even when there was a "commingling of duties re-
lating to interstate and intrastate operations. 8 3 Southern Railway
v. United States,84 had sustained the Safety Appliance Act85 with
respect to cars in interstate travel even though it necessarily em-
braced cars that were used in intrastate travel as well. In the Sec-
ond Employers' Liability Cases,"6 the Court had sustained Con-
gress' authority to allocate liability for accidents caused to
employees in interstate commerce, even when they were caused by
employees engaged in intrastate commerce. These cases arguably
82 Id. at 351-52.
:3 Id. at 352.
4 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
" Ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
86 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
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could be justified under some protective principle as a response to
the same hard choice faced by the Court in The Daniel Ball: if
Congress were confined to matters that were purely in interstate
commerce, then it could never legislate to the limit of its jurisdic-
tion . 7 Yet for Congress to reach the full limits of its jurisdiction it
must on some occasions go beyond it. The choice is necessarily ei-
ther over- or underinclusion. It is hard to gainsay a judicial deci-
sion that opts for the former over the latter, at least in cases where
interstate and intrastate commerce are inextricable, such as differ-
ent railroad cars on the same train. A necessary and proper clause
argument has evident force here. 8
Justice Hughes (the same Justice Hughes who later as Chief Jus-
tice wrote NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.)s9 made it ap-
pear in the Shreveport Rate Case that there was a seamless web
encompassing both the safety cases and the rate regulation cases.
But the rate regulation case marked an expansion of the commerce
power, although perhaps an inadvertent one, beyond the safety
cases that preceded it. The commerce clause was at issue in the
safety cases because railroad cars were used for both interstate and
intrastate runs at different times, and were often mixed on the
same train. There was thus a "commingling of duties relating to
interstate and intrastate operations."9 0 Yet no such commingling
existed with respect to the rate structures, as it was surely possible
to regulate interstate fares without regulating intrastate fares. The
various rate schedules were distinct; it was possible for the ICC to
set rates on the interstate runs without having to set them on in-
trastate activities. Indeed, it appears that this was Congress' inten-
tion in passing the original statute."1 In order to uphold the ex-
'" See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
8 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
9 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see infra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.
90 The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 352.
9' The actual language of the Interstate Commerce Act appears to have precluded the
regulations that were sustained in the case. Section 3, which prevented "undue or unreason-
able preference or advantage" to one person over another, was subject to a proviso that
read:
Provided, however, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to the transporta-
tion of passengers or property, or to the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of
property, wholly within one State, and not shipped to or from a foreign country or to
any State or Territory as aforesaid.
The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting the Interstate Commerce Act).
Yet this remnant of Chief Justice Marshall's "internal commerce" of the several states did
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panded jurisdiction sought by the ICC, the "commingled"
approach of the safety cases had to yield to a broader formulation
whereby Congress could extend "its control over the interstate car-
rier in all matters having . . . a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce."92 At this point the Justices should have con-
sidered whether the risks of overextension of federal power were
worth running. But, lacking an underlying theory of the risks of
regulation, the Court acted as though any exercise of the congres-
sional jurisdiction were benign. The path of broad construction
and social virtue again coincided, in the Court's view.
For all their nimble footwork, the authors of the Shreveport
Rate Case did not necessarily commit the Court to an all-inclusive
view of the commerce clause. The regulations in question were im-
posed upon the intrastate business of interstate carriers. Congress'
commerce power did not yet necessarily reach intrastate carriers
that did not engage in any interstate business. In addition, the
Shreveport Rate Case tied federal regulation of local business to
proof of discrimination against interstate commerce. The ICC
could not have comprehensively regulated the entire railway busi-
ness under its authority alone, for some local rates at least were
not set in conjunction with discriminatory interstate rates. Yet this
barrier too was quickly overrun by the Court in Wisconsin Rail-
road Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad,93
which upheld the constitutionality of one of the worst pieces of
modern economic legislation, the Transportation Act of 1920.1
The Act replaced specific control of long-haul/short-haul problems
with comprehensive regulation of the railroad industry, and helped
cartelize an entire industry by imposing comprehensive rate of re-
turn regulation. 5 Yet, under the rationale of the Shreveport Rate
not long survive. The Court concluded that the proviso did not apply "when the Commis-
sion finds that unjust discrimination against interstate trade arises from the relation of in-
trastate to interstate rates as maintained by a carrier subject to the act." Id. at 358. Cer-
tainly there was no reference to unjust discrimination in the proviso, which would have been
wholly redundant if it reached only those cases in which no discrimination was present, for
these were precisely the cases lacking conduct which the ICC could find unlawful.
92 Id. at 355.
9- 257 U.S. 563 (1922).
9' Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456 (current version at scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1987)).
" "The. . . most novel and most important feature of the act, requires the Commission
so to prescribe rates as to enable the carriers as a whole, or in groups selected by the Coin-
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Case, the statute could not have been sustained in its entirety
under the commerce clause because it reached local railroad runs
that by no stretch of the imagination competed with interstate
runs."" On these local routes a showing of nondiscrimination, so
critical to the Shreveport Rate Case, could not be made. But the
Court again took a benevolent view of an expansive statute,9 7 find-
ing that Congress could ensure that the costs of running railroads
were properly distributed between interstate and intrastate
carriers.98
The connection between federal jurisdiction, interest group
politics, and substantive entitlements is clear. The Court adopted a
benevolent, public interest interpretation of the 1920 statute, and
hence saw no risk in extending federal power farther than prior law
had taken it. But too much regulation is always at least as risky as
too little." Furthermore, the Court's extension of the commerce
clause in the Shreveport Rate Case dictated the likely structure of
future regulation, to which the Court also was to acquiesce. It was
mission, to earn an aggregate annual net railway operating income equal to a fair return on
the aggregate value of the railway property used in transportation." Wisconsin R.R.
Comm'n, 257 U.S. at 584. This is merely a nice way to describe cartelization of the railroad
industry.
See id. at 579-80.
' See id. at 583. Typically, expanded government authority during the First World War
set the stage for expanded government authority after peace had returned.
" The Court wrote:
Congress in its control of its interstate commerce system is seeking in the Transpor-
tation Act to make the system adequate to the needs of the country by securing for it
a reasonable compensatory return for all the work it does. The States are seeking to
use that same system for intrastate traffic. That entails large duties and expenditures
on the interstate commerce system which may burden it unless compensation is re-
ceived for the intrastate business reasonably proportionate to that for the interstate
business. Congress as the dominant controller of interstate commerce may, therefore,
restrain undue limitation of the earning power of the interstate commerce system in
doing state work. The affirmative power of Congress in developing interstate com-
merce agencies is clear.
Id. at 589-90.
" "Capture," whether by railroads wishing to cartelize their industry, or by shippers
wishing to ship their goods below cost, is an inherent risk of all forms of regulation. The
basic insight here is that regulation of all forms constitutes an implicit transfer of wealth
among private individuals. The difficult question is to determine which interest group or
groups will be able to take over, or capture the process. See McChesney, Rent Extraction
and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. Legal Stud. 101 (1987);
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ. 211 (1976);
Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 22 (1971); Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
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not possible, or at least it was less possible, to have comprehensive
rate-of-return regulation, complete with control over entry, if Con-
gress could not touch the local portions of the railroad business. If
the emphasis had remained on the long-haul/short-haul problem,
then a system of federal and state regulation that limited congres-
sional control to wholly interstate trips would have been adequate
to the task. The original ICA thus was clearly superior to its 1920
version. It was only the judicial expansion of the commerce clause
that made it possible for Congress to adopt its own unfortunate
substantive provisions.
The game has still not run its course, for even the decisions of
the Court in rate cases after the Shreveport Rate Case do not
mandate the conclusion that the commerce clause is all-embracing.
To see the remaining distinctions, consider the fate of one critical
passage from the Shreveport Rate Case:
Congress is empowered to regulate,-that is, to provide the law for
the government of interstate commerce; to enact 'all appropriate
legislation' for its 'protection and advancement;' to adopt measures
'to promote its growth and insure its safety;' 'to foster, protect,
control and restrain.' Its authority, extending to these interstate
carriers as instruments of interstate commerce, necessarily em-
braces the right to control their operations in all matters having
such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the
control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to
the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of
conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted
upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance.1°0
This passage appears to say that the commerce clause supports
congressional power over the instruments of commerce, that is, the
railroads and the highways, because of the impossibility of disen-
tangling the various threads of interstate and intrastate business,
but extends no further. Federal jurisdiction over commerce would
end at the railroad station, with the already bloated ICC of the
1920 Act. This judgment implies no preference for regulated over-
competitive industries. The railroads have serious long-haul/short-
haul problems that make the competitive solution difficult. In any
event, the conflict is not between federal regulation and market
competition. Instead it is a conflict between state and federal regu-
'o The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351 (citation omitted).
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lation, and there is no reason to think a priori that one will be
superior, by whatever measure, to the other.
One could therefore find a stable stopping point to the com-
merce power by limiting its reach to transportation by rail, river,
road, and today, by air. Congressional power would be limited to
commerce as traditionally understood, even though it would reach
intrastate as well as interstate commerce with respect to those
transportation facilities that were devoted to both.
It is possible, however, to unhinge the last fragment of the previ-
ous passage from the whole so as to make it appear that any com-
petition, from whatever source, justifies federal regulation. Just
that step was taken during the New Deal. But before we turn to
this ultimate transformation of the Shreveport Rate Case line of
cases,10 1 it will be instructive to examine the other two lines of
commerce clause cases.
2. What Goods May Be Shipped in Interstate Commerce?
The pre-New Deal expansion of the commerce clause did not
stem solely from the federal regulation of the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. It was also intimately connected to the types
of goods that could be shipped in interstate commerce at all. These
cases, it seems clear, did not necessarily involve only commerce
among the several states, although the regulated goods were in
transit from one state to another. But the relevant questions were,
and remain, intractable because both the motive and effect of con-
gressional regulation concerned matters that were themselves not
within the "stream of commerce," at least as the phrase was under-
stood before 1937. The true goal of these regulations was to gov-
ern-"influence" is not a strong enough word-the behavior of in-
dividuals and firms before their goods entered commerce or after
they left it. In evaluating the statutes, the Court was required to
consider the interaction between the commerce clause and the rest
of the constitutional structure, in particular the principle that
Congress possessed only the limited and enumerated powers con-
ferred upon it by article I-powers that did not allow it to intrude
upon the reserved powers of the states. The drawing of the rele-
vant lines is by no means an easy task. But there is on balance
1*1 See infra notes 185-234 and accompanying text.
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good reason to believe that here too the Court, even before the
1937 revolution, construed the commerce clause in ways that ex-
tended the power of Congress beyond its proper scope.
The first case in the line was Champion v. Ames" 2 in 1903. The
question before the Court was whether Congress under the com-
merce clause could prohibit the transportation of lottery tickets
across state lines.10 3 The first Justice Harlan's opinion upheld the
statute as a proper application of the commerce power.104 But Jus-
tice Harlan's defense of federal power in Champion is problematic.
Although the statute in question operated on articles of interstate
commerce, its purpose surely was not to protect or to facilitate in-
terstate commerce. Quite the opposite-its purpose was designed
to influence the primary conduct of individuals, either before the
goods entered interstate commerce or before it left them. One tell-
tale sign of the new aggressiveness to which the commerce power
was turned was that Congress sought to prohibit, not to regulate,
the transfer of lottery tickets in interstate commerce. In and of
itself, this fact hardly seems dispositive, for it is doubtful that the
commerce clause could be read so that "regulation" occupies a do-
main so narrow that all types of prohibition fall outside the power
of Congress. Hamilton himself spoke of "prohibitory regulations"
when addressing in The Federalist No. 11 the need to regulate
commerce with foreign nations.10 5 If these prohibitions are (regret-
tably) proper in the foreign context, then they cannot be wholly
banished in the domestic one.
Analytically, too, it seems that regulations comprehend prohibi-
tions. To be sure, regulation and prohibition do not mean the same
thing, and the Constitution itself uses the two terms in clear oppo-
sition to each other.106 It would be very odd indeed to say that
102 188 U.S. 321 (1903). The appellants attempted as an initial maneuver to keep the case
outside the commerce clause altogether, by arguing that lottery tickets were not articles of
commerce at all, but were instead "mere evidences of contract made wholly within the
boundaries of a State, which contracts are valid or invalid according to the municipal law of
the State where made or attempted to be enforced." Id. at 327. This argument seems weak.
If the writing has a tangible form, and if the ticket can be bought or sold, then something,
rather than nothing, is working its way through the channels of interstate commerce.
103 Id. at 327.
I" See id. at 353-54.
101 See supra note 14.
"o See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress
[Vol. 73:13871422
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Congress had the power "to prohibit all commerce with foreign na-
tions, among the states, or with the Indian tribes," for the total
elimination of all trade seems hard to reconcile with the original
vision of vibrant national markets unimpeded by petty local regu-
lations. 10 7 But it is difficult to have the extreme case determine the
principle, given the massive overlap between regulations and
prohibitions in ordinary speech. The class of conditional prohibi-
tions-of the sort which say that no goods may travel in interstate
commerce unless evidenced by a bill of lading-is so extensive, and
benign, that it is difficult to see how any jurisdictional limitation
on congressional power could be erected on the strength of the ver-
bal distinction alone.
The source of the uneasiness with Champion does not, however,
disappear even if we acknowledge, however uneasily, that all
prohibitions are regulations within the meaning of the commerce
clause. Instead, the common concern with both regulations and
prohibitions of the sort found in Champion and its progeny is that
Congress will use its powers of regulation to upset the doctrine of
enumerated powers. Stated otherwise, Champion is perhaps the
first case in which Congress had consciously sought to exploit the
outer reaches of the commerce clause in ways that might trench
upon the power of the states. In one sense, the Congress stayed
within the commerce clause because Chief Justice Marshall told us
that the commerce power is "plenary" over everything that comes
within its specified limits. But in another sense Congress used its
plenary power to arrogate to itself matters reserved to the states.
The uneasiness that one thus feels with Champion is quite similar
to that which is provoked by the troublesome doctrine of unconsti-
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed
on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person."). Clearly any regulation
that made it impossible to import slaves (note the euphemism in the text) into the United
States was prohibited as well. For the vexed relationship of this clause to the commerce
power, see Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 Yale L.J. 198 (1968).
Note, however, that although the commerce clause might have given Congress the power to
regulate (or even prohibit) the slave trade, it did not give it the power to regulate the posi-
tion of the slaves located within the state, much less to prohibit slavery.
1o7 This argument was well made by the appellant's counsel in oral argument. Champion,
188 U.S. at 329-30 (argument of appellant). There the point was limited to the transfer of
"promissory notes, of deed, of bonds, of contracts for personal services, etc." Id. In princi-
ple, however, it could extend to the underlying goods shipped in interstate commerce as
well.
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tutional conditions, which no one quite understands, but which no
one will nonetheless ignore.'018 One way to read unconstitutional
conditions is an effort by the state to expand its power over the
private activities of individuals by conditioning their access to
public facilities, most typically roads: thus the doctrine has been
invoked to hold that the state cannot allow a private carrier to use
the public highways unless it first agrees (without compensation)
to be regulated as a public carrier. 09 The clear function of the doc-
trine is to curb the state desire to use its power of public instru-
mentalities to control private behavior, even though it is allowed to
exclude vehicles of certain classes from the highways altogether.
The Champion line of cases shows the same type of tensions at
work, as the Court struggled to find the line that allowed the
power of Congress to remain plenary, without undermining the re-
served powers of the state. Some forms of regulations, and indeed
prohibitions, seem not to threaten the delicate balance of the fed-
eral system. As the dissent in Champion suggested, for example, a
clear instance of an acceptable prohibition is one preventing the
shipment in interstate commerce of goods that are themselves a
peril to interstate commerce:
The power to prohibit the transportation of diseased animals and
infected goods over railroads or on steamboats is an entirely differ-
ent thing, for they would be in themselves injurious to the transac-
tion of interstate commerce, and, moreover, are essentially com-
mercial in their nature. And the exclusion of diseased persons rests
on different ground, for nobody would pretend that persons could
be kept off the trains because they were going from one State to
another to engage in the lottery business.' ' O
Here there is no concern that Congress by the use of a single enu-
merated power is trying to dominate the states in the exercise of
108 The principle states that "a state is without power to impose an unconstitutional re-
quirement as a condition for granting a privilege." Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 598 (1926). The most exhaustive treatment of the subject is found in
Kreimer, Allocation Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984). I have addressed the use of the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions in the context of eminent domain in Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1986
Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming).
109 This connection between the commerce clause and the fifth amendment was noted by
counsel for appellees in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1917), who insisted that there
was a higher level of judicial review under the commerce clause. See id. at 267.
110 Champion, 188 U.S. at 374 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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their reserved powers.
Similarly, a somewhat broader but wholly defensible line could
stress the harmony between federal and state regulation. Suppose
that the statute at issue in Champion prohibited the shipment of
lottery tickets from any state in which their production was illegal
or into any state in which their possession was illegal. Here the
congressional statute would be in aid of valid legislation at the
state level. It would reinforce, rather than contradict, state law. In
Champion, however, the tie between state and federal regulation
was nonexistent, or even negative. The shipment of lottery tickets
was forbidden in interstate commerce although their use may have
been wholly legal in the states from which and to which they were
sent. To be sure, if congressional power under the commerce clause
had been clearly established, the supremacy clause would have re-
solved the conflict between state and federal laws in Congress'
favor.111 But the supremacy clause is of no help until the proper
scope of the commerce clause has been first determined, in light of
the concerns raised by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
The narrower tests previously discussed would not seem to allow
the Champion prohibition. These two tests-"in aid of" state legis-
lation, and the "noxious use" test-would not make the commerce
clause a dead letter, but they also respect the independent power
of the states.
There was yet a third line of argument that could have prevailed
in Champion. The case could have rested on a peculiar amalgam of
the police power and the commerce clause, showing yet again the
affinity between jurisdictional and substantive concerns. Lottery
tickets were an issue toward which states had long taken a quite
schizophrenic attitude. Sometimes the states prohibited lotteries;
sometimes they allowed private firms to run them under state
charter; sometimes they ran the lotteries themselves."" Generally
speaking, gambling fell within the class of dubious private activi-
ties subject to police power regulation, along with, for example,
prostitution. One possible stopping point under the commerce
clause would provide that Congress could prohibit the transmission
in interstate commerce of those goods which a state could ban
See U.S. Const. art. VI.
" For a checkered history of lotteries passing in and out of favor in one state, see Stone
v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1881).
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under its police power, as it was then understood, even if the state
had not actually prohibited their use. Justice Harlan, who wrote
the majority opinion in Champion, always gave an expansive, 113
and occasionally maddeningly extravagant,11 4 scope to the police
power whenever supposed issues of health and morals arose,
though otherwise he was a tiger in defense of individual liberty and
freedom of contract." 5 Justice Harlan's opinion in Champion em-
phasized the police power, stressing the iniquitous nature of lotter-
ies and asking, "why may not Congress, invested with the power to
regulate commerce among the several States, provide that such
commerce shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets
from one State to another?" 116 Harlan rejected the idea that the
commerce clause "countenances the suggestion that one may, of
right, carry or cause to be carried from one State to another that
which will harm the public morals." 117
The question then arises: Could the argument equating prohibi-
tion under the police power with prohibition under the commerce
clause survive? Why not? It is an argument that could permit the
federal government to regulate the transport of prostitutes across
state lines,"18 whether or not prostitution was legal in the state to
which they were sent, or to prohibit the sale of adulterated foods
and drugs. °9 Note that each of these examples would be far more
secure if the sale of the ultimate product or service were illegal in
the state to which the goods were shipped, as was typically the
"I See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory vacci-
nation); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 674 (1887) (upholding prohibition of alcoholic bev-
erages); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting from holding
that New York could not limit bakers' working hours).
"4 See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 683-87 (1888) (upholding prohibition of
manufacture or sale of margarine).
115 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (upholding freedom of contract
between employer and employee); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (holding confiscatory
state railroad rate regulations to be violations of the 14th amendment); Berea College v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58-70 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing racial segregation).
"I Champion, 188 U.S. at 356.
"1 Id.
118 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S.
308, 322 (1913) (noting the link between the police power and the commerce clause).
M See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911). Hipolite was confined to
"illicit articles-articles which the law seeks to keep out of commerce because, they are
debased by adulteration," id. at 57, and which were "at their point of destination in the
original, unbroken packages," id. at 58.
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case. This somewhat broader conception, although perhaps less
preferable than the more limited versions of the commerce clause
discussed above, would still have left its scope less than
comprehensive.
It was just this conception of the relationship between the com-
merce clause and the police power that held the line against fed-
eral power in Hammer v. Dagenhart.120 In Hammer, federal legis-
lation forbade the shipment in interstate commerce of any goods
manufactured in any plant that used child labor in ways prohib-
ited by the statute within a thirty-day period prior to the ship-
ment.121 There was no requirement that the actual goods shipped
in interstate commerce had to have been made by child la-
bor-only that some goods made at the plant had been made with
the use of child labor. The validity of the statute was hardly com-
pelled by Champion, for the sale of ordinary clothing could not be
prohibited as an illicit item of commerce under even the most ex-
travagant version of the police power. Indeed, the Court under-
stood the statute for what it was; it was not an effort to control the
goods themselves, but to prescribe the internal rules governing
their manufacture within the state.'22 The delicacy of this legisla-
tion was manifest in an age when direct federal regulation of man-
ufacture had been precluded by the Supreme Court in United
States v. E.C. Knight. 23 In Hammer the Supreme Court stuck to
its guns, and by a narrow five-four decision refused to extend
Champion beyond the noxious or dangerous products to which it
applied.
On balance, Hammer was correctly decided, assuming that the
commerce clause must be understood within the larger structural
context of the Constitution. Thus, if the child labor statute in
Hammer had been good law, one can envision the following cycle
of evasion and response: A firm using child labor now divides its
business into two halves, subject to common stock ownership. One
half makes goods for intrastate commerce using child labor, while
the other half makes goods for interstate commerce without using
,20 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
"' Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675. This act prohibited all labor by children
under 14, and allowed children between the ages of 14 and 16 to work only eight-hour days,
six days per week.
"' Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272.
,2- 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see infra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
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child labor. Congress then passes a new statute which says that no
firm whose shareholders have a dominant interest in a second firm
that uses child labor may send its goods into interstate commerce.
The firm decides to go out of the interstate business altogether.
Congress next passes a statute which says that no firm that ac-
quires part of its supplies from any firm that uses child labor may
ship its goods in interstate commerce, whether or not the goods
made with child labor are incorporated into its own goods shipped
interstate.
Why stop here? If the political will exists, Congress can pass a
law which states that no firm in any state may ship its goods in
interstate commerce unless every other firm within that state for-
swears the use of child labor. In each case the statute technically
regulates only goods within the stream of interstate commerce. If
prohibitions are simply forms of regulation, then Congress can
raise the price of state independence so high that even the fool-
hardy must capitulate. Congress can make any use of child labor a
federal issue by redefining the keys that unlock the gates to inter-
state commerce. If child labor can be reached by Congress, then so
can everything else reserved to the states. A "Congressional Mar-
riage Act" could provide that "no manufacturer can ship its goods
in interstate commerce unless its state legislature passes a statute
under which all local marriages conform to the federal require-
ments." These concerns were indeed raised by Justice Day, who
wrote the majority opinion in Hammer.124 Justice Day correctly
noted that prior cases were limited to cases in which the "use of
interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment of
harmful results,"'125 and held that only the limited version of the
commerce clause was consistent with the tenth amendment. 12 He
noted that competition within the federal system was essential to
the original constitutional design. 27
124 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271.
225 Id.
126 Id. at 273-74.
127 Justice Day wrote:
There is no power vested in Congress to require the States to exercise their police
power so as to prevent possible unfair competition. Many causes may cooperate to
give one State, by reason of local laws or conditions, -an economic advantage over
others. The Commerce Clause was not intended to give to Congress a general author-
ity to equalize such conditions.
Id. at 273.
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Justice Holmes in dissent wrote a spirited and perceptive de-
fense of the congressional power:
The act does not meddle with anything belonging to the States.
They may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic com-
merce as they like. But when they seek to send their products
across the state line they are no longer within their rights. If there
were no Constitution and no Congress their power to cross the line
would depend upon their neighbors. Under the Constitution such
commerce belongs not to the States but to Congress to regulate. "8
Holmes surely overstated his point. No one doubted that Con-
gress had the power to override any state effort to block the ship-
ment of goods in interstate commerce. But the justification of one
use of that power hardly demanded acceptance of any use of it.
The child labor statute in Hammer was invalid because Congress
had used its admitted powers over interstate commerce to elimi-
nate a state's "internal affairs" completely. Holmes never ad-
dressed this limit to his principles, nor identified the expansive
statutes that his views necessarily tolerated-even though he had
previously warned against interpreting the commerce clause so as
to allow Congress to reach every productive endeavor of human
life. 12 His observation that no statute should be upset because it
has "indirect effects" upon the domestic affairs of the state'30 sim-
ply failed to address the structural threats that the child labor
statutes posed to the distribution of state and federal power.
Justice Day's majority opinion in Hammer was strong on the ju-
risdictional side, but apologetic on the substantive side. 131 The is-
sue of child labor laws had long been an emotional one, and there
was a powerful consensus in the Progressive movement that these
statutes were absolutely necessary to counteract the evils of an un-
restrained laissez-faire economic system which tolerated, and in-
deed encouraged, child labor. The Solicitor General, John W. Davis
(who later represented the southern states in Brown v. Board of
Education"2 ), insisted that, although the need was pressing, indi-
12 Id. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
129 See Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 402-03 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
"I Hammer, 247 U.S. at 277.
M See id. at 276-77.
132 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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vidual states were reluctant to enact their own child labor statutes
because they feared that their manufacturers would be harmed by
competition from industries in states still employing child labor:
The shipment of child-made goods outside of one State directly
induces similar employment of children in competing States. It is
not enough to answer that each State theoretically may regulate
conditions of manufacturing within its own borders. As Congress
saw the situation, the States were not entirely free agents. For sal-
utary statutes had been repealed, legislative action on their part
had been defeated and postponed time and again, solely by reason
of the argument (valid or not) that interstate competition could
not be withstood. 133
The quoted passage was something of an overstatement, as every
state in the Union, including North Carolina (the state at issue in
Hammer), had some statute regulating child labor on its books.3
The real question was whether the weaker North Carolina statute,
which forbade child labor below the age of twelve, was preferable
to the federal minimum of fourteen.13 5
Justice Day made no substantive attack on the child labor
laws-rather, he sympathized with them. 36 Justice Day was in the
awkward position of having to defend jurisdictional limitations
that worked against what he thought to be highly desirable social
regulation.
The case takes on a different complexion, however, if one looks
with even modest suspicion on child labor statutes, as I do, and
thinks that as a general rule the only proper grounds for govern-
ment intervention in family relations are abuse or neglect. Any
reader of Laura Ingalls Wilder's Farmer Boy knows that child la-
bor was not a creature of the industrial revolution.3 7 Arduous la-
bor, day and night, without any employer to regulate or to sue has
always been the lot of farm children. The children in the factories
were certainly not as well off as we would like, but they were prob-
133 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 256-57 (argument of appellant).
13 Id. at 275 ("That such employment [e.g., child labor] is generally deemed to require
regulation is shown by the fact that the brief of counsel states that every State in the Union
has a law upon the subject, limiting the right to thus employ children.").
"' Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268-69 n.1.
136 "That there should be limitations upon the right to employ children in mines and
factories in the interest of their own and the public welfare, all will admit." Id. at 275.
137 See L. Wilder, Farmer Boy (1933).
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ably better off than they would have been back on the farm, or
than if they had been left in the city without any opportunity to
sell their labor. Their families had voted to leave the farm or the
old country with their feet, as a matter of life and death.13 8 Under
this view, the substantive reforms may well have been misguided
initiatives that inflicted harm upon the very persons they were os-
tensibly intended to benefit. Child labor changes in its character
and intensity as changes occur in the means of production, the in-
come level of parents, and the returns to children from more edu-
cation. Restrictions on child labor may be proposed as ways to pre-
vent child neglect and abuse, but the case for them is far from self-
evident. Even if the police power is thought to be extensive enough
to "protect" children from their parents as a constitutional matter,
as it surely was by 1918,19 there is a clear risk that the proper
limits of the police power will be exceeded when legislation is used
by interest groups that do not rely upon child labor to undercut
rivals who do. Stated otherwise, child labor legislation could well
be misguided paternalism or interest-group politics.
This skeptical view of the substantive issues in Hammer should
caution one against reading more into the commerce clause than
its language, or its place in the overall constitutional structure, al-
lows. There is no obvious reason to approach the jurisdiction ques-
tion with the assumption that child labor laws are intrinsically
good, if only we knew how to enact them. Their strength, far from
being a given, should be tested in competition between states.
Such competition would show the true importance of child labor
laws to the state: Will a state impose the restriction even when
local firms may be hampered in interstate competition? The legis-
lative question surely is not an all-or-nothing one. Indeed, the dif-
ference between North Carolina's twelve-year limit and Congress'
fourteen is surely only a question of degree, and it is far from self-
3' See I. Howe, The World of Our Fathers (1976). Howe's book is notable for its discus-
sion of the unintended harmful consequences of turn-of-the-century social legislation on the
very people it was supposed to protect. Howe himself is a social democrat who supports such
legislation, but his accounts reveal his obvious sense of puzzlement about the issue, although
he was not moved to change his substantive positions. See, e.g., id. at 150-53 (discussing the
mixed results of housing legislation in New York, including the 1901 statute that forbade
further construction of the so-called "dumbbell" tenements).
13' See, e.g., the account of the police power given in New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243
U.S. 188, 207 (1917).
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evident which minimum is better, assuming there should be child
labor laws at all.
The relatively clean line in Hammer prevented Congress from
using its power over the movement of goods in interstate com-
merce to regulate the terms and conditions of their production.
The line of cases regarding what types of goods could be shipped
in interstate commerce thus imposed real limitations on the power
of Congress. To be sure, the ICC cases afforded Congress powerful
jurisdiction over the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 140
But even when broadly construed these still stopped with the rail-
roads and navigable waters (and by obvious extension interstate
highways and interstate airplane transportation). The line between
state police power and the commerce clause had shifted, and there
is reason to think that some of the shifts had already placed too
many matters on the federal side of the line. But the case law was
still a long way from giving Congress comprehensive powers to reg-
ulate all productive activities.
3. Manufacturing and Commerce
I now turn to the last line of cases necessary to complete the
overall picture-those that drew the sharp and structural line be-
tween commerce on one hand and manufacture (or production and
agriculture) on the other. This line of cases began with United
States v. E.C. Knight Co.'4' in 1895, and retained its overall valid-
ity until the 1937 term. What follows is an account of how that line
of cases developed, and retained, its distinct position from the two
groups of cases just considered.
E.C. Knight was the first constitutional challenge to the Sher-
man Act.142 At issue was the acquisition by the American Sugar
Refining Company, a New Jersey corporation, of four Pennsylvania
corporations that manufactured refined sugar. The United States
challenged the merger under the Sherman Act as "a combination
or contract in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states.'143 The Court held that the merger could not be reached by
the Sherman Act because it was not part of interstate commerce
140 See supra notes 74-101 and accompanying text.
141 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
-42 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1980) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1982)).
.4 E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 9.
[Vol. 73:13871432
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and had no "direct" effect upon it.' 4 Chief Justice Fuller made a
conscious effort to delineate the respective spheres of the state po-
lice power and the commerce clause in his majority opinion in ways
that harken back to Gibbons v. Ogden:
Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it. The
power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by
which commerce shall be governed, and is a power independent of
the power to suppress monopoly. But it may operate in repression
of monopoly whenever that comes within the rules by which com-
merce is governed or whenever the transaction is itself a monopoly
of commerce.
It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of
the police power, and the delimitation between them, however
sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed,
for while the one furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other
is essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the States as
required by our dual form of government; and acknowledged evils,
however grave and urgent they may appear to be, had better be
borne, than the risk be run, in the effort to suppress them, of more
serious consequences by resort to expedients of even doubtful
constitutionality.
Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among
the several States, the transportation and its instrumentalities, and
articles bought, sold, or exchanged for the purposes of such transit
among the States, or put in the way of transit, may be regulated,
but this is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce.
The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another
State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce,
and the intent of the manufacturer does not determine the time
when the article or product passes from the control of the State
and belongs to commerce. 145
Chief Justice Fuller tried to raise a barrier between manufac-
ture, on the one hand, and sale or shipment of goods in interstate
commerce, on the other. But the barrier was not as well-defined as
Chief Justice Fuller made it out to be. Justice Harlan forcefully
made this point in his dissent, noting that this merger was
designed to regulate not only the manufacturing of refined sugar
I" Id. at 16-17.
"4 Id. at 12-13.
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but also "selling sugar in different parts of the country. '146 The
transaction in E.C. Knight had two purposes: manufacture, over
which there could be a local monopoly that Congress could not
reach, and a plan for restrictive interstate sale, designed to raise
prices in interstate markets. The status of the sales plan element
of the merger was the subject of dispute between the Justices.
Chief Justice Fuller's majority opinion allowed federal regulation
of the contracts by which the sugar was bought and sold.147 Yet it
reads as though it would not have allowed the regulation of a
structural agreement made prior to actual sales, by which the par-
ties agreed to sell only certain amounts in interstate commerce at
certain prices. According to his view, this master agreement would
fall outside of the scope of the commerce clause. Justice Harlan's
dissent, on the other hand, did not attack Chief Justice Fuller's
position that "commerce succeeds manufacture." Instead he ar-
gued that manufacture became commerce when the sugar was sold
to be transported, not subsequently, when it actually was placed in
interstate transport:
It is said that manufacture precedes commerce and is not a part of
it. But it is equally true that when manufacture ends, that which
has been manufactured becomes a subject of commerce; that buy-
ing and selling succeed manufacture, come into existence after the
process of manufacture is completed, precede transportation and
are as much commercial intercourse, where articles are bought to
be carried from one State to another, as is the manual transporta-
tion of such articles after they have been so purchased.14 8
Justice Harlan never quite closed in on the essential issue in the
case. The government did not attack the individual contracts for
sale of sugar in interstate commerce, but only the prior structural
arrangements that influenced the terms on which the interstate
sales were made. In most antitrust cases the contracts for the divi-
sion of markets or the maintenance of prices are separate and dis-
tinct from any contract arrangements for the manufacture or sale
of goods. But the transaction at issue in E.C. Knight was a merger
that was quite impossible for Congress to reach by a plan to regu-
late the interstate sales of the combined sugar business (even if
Id. at 18 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"7 See id. at 12-13.
"I Id. at 35-36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 73:13871434
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these preliminary merger agreements were regarded as in inter-
state commerce) without necessarily intruding into the regulation
of manufacture, which both the majority and the dissent expressly
regarded as outside the scope of the commerce clause. 149 E.C.
Knight was thus an early version of the Shreveport Rate Case
problem, in which the Court recognized that the regulation of in-
terstate commerce was necessarily either over- or underinclusive. 15 0
The difference between the majority and dissenting opinions in
E.C. Knight is best explained as a response to the issue of whether
too much or too little regulation was desired. Justice Harlan in dis-
sent thought that the regulation was appropriate, for the peril of
national monopolies was too great to be ignored.151 To Chief Jus-
tice Fuller, on the other hand, the decisive consideration was that
the expansion of the commerce power to meet the danger of mo-
nopoly ran the far greater risk of upsetting the grand constitu-
tional balance between the federal and the state governments.1 5
That is why he was so eager to strike down any statute of "even
doubtful constitutionality. 1 53
Unfortunately, these genuine substantive concerns were not in-
corporated into a careful analysis of the error costs of alternative
jurisdictional rules. Instead the debate focused on the question
whether the regulation had an impact on interstate commerce that
was "direct or immediate" or "remote or indirect. 1 5 These ab-
stract, largely nondescriptive terms simply could not carry the vast
institutional weight placed upon them in future years. The E.C.
Knight opinions, in retrospect, seem in large part to be simple
word games or metaphysical abstractions rather than debates
about important principles.
149 See id. at 12, 36-37 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
,5o See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
's' Justice Harlan wrote:
If this combination, so far as its operations necessarily or directly affect interstate
commerce, cannot be restrained or suppressed under some power granted to Con-
gress, it will be cause for regret that the patriotic statesmen who framed the Consti-
tution did not foresee the necessity of investing the national government with power
to deal with gigantic monopolies holding in their grasp, and injuriously controlling in
their own interest, the entire trade among the States in food products that are essen-
tial to the comfort of every household in the land.
E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 13.
153 Id.
151 Id. at 15-16.
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The difference between the two sides, moreover, was not as great
as might be supposed. The substantial common ground between
Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan is clearly borne out by
looking at the next important case in the line, Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States,15 5 written for a unanimous Supreme
Court by Justice Peckham, who is today largely remembered for
his opinion in Lochner v. New York striking down New York's ten-
hour maximum daily labor law for bakers. 156 Addyston Pipe up-
held a federal attack on an explicit contract by cast-iron pipe pro-
ducers to divide the territorial market for their product among
themselves in order to create a set of local monopolies. 57 At one
level the case appears indistinguishable from E.C. Knight, from
which it differed solely by the method chosen by the parties to
obtain their monopoly prices. A merger of manufacturing busi-
nesses was the method of choice in E.C. Knight, while an explicit
cartelization was chosen in Addyston Pipe. If the sole question was
whether there was a "direct" or "indirect" effect upon commerce,
whether by the price or volume of goods shipped, the two cases
could hardly be distinguished. If a merger designed to raise prices
has only an "indirect" effect upon commerce, then so too does a
cartel arrangement with that same purpose and effect.
155 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
156 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Yet Justice Peckham did not simply use "freedom of contract" as a
phrase to conceal all understanding of regulatory issues. In Addyston Pipe, for example, he
was explicit about the limits of freedom of contract in its constitutional guise:
It has been held that the word "liberty," as used in the Constitution, was not to be
confined to the mere liberty of person, but included, among others, a right to enter
into certain classes of contracts for the purpose of enabling the citizen to carry on his
business. But it has never been, and in our opinion ought not to be, held that the
word included the right of an individual to enter into private contracts upon all sub-
jects, no matter what their nature and wholly irrespective (among other things) of the
fact that they would, if performed, result in the regulation of interstate commerce
and in the violation of an act of Congress upon that subject.
Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 228-29 (citation omitted).
The passage is odd in the sense that it treats private contracts as the equivalent of public
regulation, and because it inverts the relationship between constitutional principle and leg-
islative action. But otherwise stated, the principle of freedom of contract does not protect
contracts in restraint of trade. The explanation for the distinction lies in the external effects
of two kinds of contracts. Contracts in restraint of trade may well have negative, systematic,
economic effects; ordinary commercial contracts have positive systematic effects. The issue
could be understood, although it was not by Justice Peckham, in terms of the just compen-
sation requirements associated with limitation of both contract and property rights. See R.
Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 202-03 (1985).
117 See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 248.
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Yet if the distinction between the two cases is viewed in light of
the underlying substantive concerns motivating the Court, then it
makes perfect sense. E.C. Knight raised two questions: first,
whether a preliminary step (be it merger or cartel) toward a pro-
posed sale of goods in interstate commerce was itself part of inter-
state commerce; and second, even if a preliminary step was part of
interstate commerce, could Congress reach it by regulating manu-
facture, which everyone conceded was not part of interstate com-
merce? Chief Justice Fuller found E.C. Knight an easy case be-
cause he was prepared to answer the second question in the
negative, given his doubts about the first. Yet in Addyston Pipe
the second question vanished, because the cartel arrangement
reached only planned interstate sales and had no influence at all
upon manufacturing. Only the first question had to be addressed.
The difficult choice between necessary over- and necessary under-
inclusion did not arise in Addyston. To apply the Sherman Act, it
needed only to be said that preliminary agreements, designed by
the parties to regulate their private sales in interstate commerce,
were themselves part of interstate commerce. 158 It did not take a
very inventive reading of Gibbons to say that these outward-look-
ing contracts were not part of the purely internal commerce of the
state. This refinement of E.C. Knight therefore did not challenge
the view that manufacture and commerce were distinct spheres.
Despite giving Congress its head in Addyston Pipe, the Court did
not intrude upon the basic principle that the power to regulate
commerce among the several states was only one of a list of enu-
merated powers. Addyston Pipe therefore hardly broke with the.
past. The Court reached a unanimous decision (with Fuller still
Chief Justice) because the risk of excessive congressional power
was not present.
The same can be said about the two other major early antitrust
decisions that invoked the commerce clause. The issue in Northern
Securities Co. v. United States1 59 was whether Congress could
reach a stock merger of two railroad lines. Congressional power was
sustained by a five-four vote, with Justice Harlan writing for the
Court and with Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Peckham (joined
by Justices Holmes and White) in dissent. The latent disagreement
158 Id. at 226-27.
159 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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that divided the Court in E.C. Knight again came to the fore, al-
beit in somewhat different form. Justice Harlan's basic posture was
unchanged. If a merger of gigantic manufacturing concerns was of
federal concern because of its direct influence on prices, he had no
reason to pause simply because the antitrust laws were applied to a
transaction in shares of stock that was local in origin and governed
by state law.160 Indeed, the fact that the underlying assets were
two interstate railroads could have only strengthened Justice
Harlan's view that the transaction had to be reached by the anti-
trust laws. It was no longer necessary, after all, to tiptoe along the
narrow line between manufacture and commerce, for the merger
did not involve any regulation of manufacturing. If Congress could
regulate the rates on interstate lines, then why should it not be
able to stop the merger?
The four dissenting Justices took a very different position. To
them, the appropriate balance between state and federal power
was as primary an issue as it had been to Chief Justice Fuller in
E.C. Knight, given that the regulation of state corporate owner-
ship, a local matter, was inseparable from the regulation of inter-
state transport.1 61 A passage from Justice Holmes' dissent shows
the interplay between two dominant motifs of the early decisions:
The point decided in [E.C. Knight] was that "the fact that trade or
commerce might be indirectly affected was not enough to entitle
complainants to a decree." Commerce depends upon population,
but Congress could not, on that ground, undertake to regulate mar-
riage and divorce. If the act before us is to be carried out according
to what seems to me the logic of the argument for the Government,
which I do not believe that it will be, I can see no part of the con-
duct of life with which on similar principles Congress might not
interfere."6 2
In a single passage, Justice Holmes was able to merge and confuse
two distinct ideas: first, that Congress could not regulate absent
direct effects on interstate commerce; and second, that the federal-
state balance of power under the founders' plan required that the
commerce clause be given some effective limits, lest the indepen-
dent powers of the states be undermined. In a sense the five-four
16o See id. at 327-28.
161 Id. at 402 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 402-03 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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vote in Northern Securities is explained in that the case was a
more powerful one for congressional action under the commerce
power than was E.C. Knight. But the differences between the ma-
jority and dissent on the question of principle were minor, and at
best Northern Securities identified the tipping point at which the
interstate elements start to dominate the overall transaction.
In Swift & Co. v. United States 6 3 decided a year later, the con-
sensus of Addyston Pipe reasserted itself. In Swift, the govern-
ment brought an antitrust case against fresh food dealers who
sought to organize bidding in livestock markets across the United
States.16 4 The distinction between this cartel and the one in Ad-
dyston Pipe was not worth pursuing, so Justice Holmes came out
of his dissent in Northern Securities and wrote for a unanimous
Court condemning this cartel for its effect on interstate commerce:
[1]t is a direct object, it is that for the sake of which the several
specific acts and courses of conduct are done and adopted. There-
fore the case is not like [E.C. Knight], where the subject matter of
the combination was manufacture and the direct object monopoly
of manufacture within a State. However likely monopoly of com-
merce among the States in the article manufactured was to follow
from the agreement it was not a necessary consequence nor a pri-
mary end. Here the subject matter is sales and the very point of
the combination is to restrain and monopolize commerce among
the States in respect of such sales.'65
Holmes's distinction between direct and indirect consequences is
unpersuasive. To use a tort analogy, it was an effort to smuggle all
the limitations on liability into the rules on remoteness of dam-
ages, without recognizing the independent status of the standard
excuses and justifications in tort law. Imagine, to push the analogy,
what tort law would look like without the defenses of consent, self-
defense, contributory negligence, or assumption of risk. In tort, the
consequence of this approach is to place incredible stress upon the
idea of causation, with a consequent loss of analytical clarity. In
constitutional law too the burden upon the idea of direct conse-
quences was too great. What was needed was an explicit acknowl-
edgment that the doctrine of enumerated powers played, in consti-
1.3 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
I Id. at 388.
115 Id. at 397.
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tutional discourse, a role parallel to the one that affirmative
defenses play under tort law.
Whatever the weaknesses in basic theory, Swift and its predeces-
sors articulated a set of boundary lines that was reasonably easy to
apply. The Court read Swift as the decisive precedent in favor of
federal power in both Stafford v. Wallace 6 and Chicago Board of
Trade v. Olsen.16 7 In neither case was the line between manufac-
ture and commerce tested, let alone overthrown.
In Stafford, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Pack-
ers and Stockyards Act of 1921,168 which regulated the middlemen
who arranged the sale and shipment of cattle from the West to
purchasers in the Chicago stockyards. 69 The Act gave to the Secre-
tary of Agriculture the power to set maximum and minimum prices
and to prohibit discriminatory and deceptive trade practices. °70
The Court relied heavily on an analogy to the "instrumentalities of
interstate commerce":
The stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination.
Thousands of head of live stock arrive daily by carload and train-
load lots, and must be promptly sold and disposed of and moved
out to give place to the constantly flowing traffic that presses be-
hind. The stockyards are but a throat through which the current
flows, and the transactions which occur therein are only incident to
this current from the West to the East, and from one State to
another."'
Olsen upheld the Grain Futures Act," 2 which regulated the sale
of grain for future delivery on boards of trade under the rationale
that manipulation of futures prices had burdened and obstructed
interstate commerce."13 Chief Justice Taft again emphasized the
-66 258 U.S. 495, 517 (1922) ("The judgment in [Swift] gives a clear and comprehensive
exposition which leaves to us in this case little but the obvious application of the principles
there declared.").
167 262 U.S. 1, 35 (1923) ("[Swift] merely fitted the commerce clause to the real and prac-
tical essence of modern business growth. It applies to the case before us just as it did in
[Stafford].").
Ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1982)).
Stafford, 258 U.S. at 514.
170 Id. at 513-14.
7 Id. at 515-16.
172 Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (current version codified as part of the Commodity Ex-
change Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
173 Olsen, 262 U.S. at 32.
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link between trade in goods and the railroads." 4
These two decisions, by involving matters ancillary to the actual
shipment of goods by the railroads, clearly expanded the scope of
the commerce power. General concern about fraud and manipula-
tion (both of which are wrongs under state law) is not an obvious
reason to allow federal regulation. It is possible therefore to argue
that the statutes themselves were unconstitutional, despite the
unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court. For the purposes of
this Article, however, it is sufficient to note that nothing in either
case challenged E.C. Knight's distinction between manufacture or
production on the one hand, and interstate commerce on the other.
As late as 1935 in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,17 5
Chief Justice Hughes wrote, in limiting the jurisdiction of Congress
under the commerce clause, "The distinction between direct and
indirect effects has been clearly recognized in the application of
the Anti-Trust Act," and then used the distinction to strike down
the National Industrial Recovery Act.17' 6 The next year, in Carter
v. Carter Coal Co.,177 a majority of the Supreme Court struck down
various provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935178 on the ground that the commerce clause did not allow the
federal government to regulate the terms of employment within
the mines. 17 9 The Carter Court correctly distinguished Stafford as
a "flow of commerce" case, in which Congress had regulated the
"throat" of interstate commerce, and nothing more.1 80 Elsewhere
,71 Chief Justice Taft wrote:
The railroads of the country accommodate themselves to the interstate function of
the Chicago market by giving shippers from western States bills of lading through
Chicago. . . for temporary purposes of storing, inspecting, weighing, grading, or mix-
ing, and changing the ownership, consignee or destination and then to continue the
shipment under the same contract and at a through rate. . . . The fact that the grain
shipped from the west and taken from the cars may have been stored in warehouses
and mixed with other grain, so that the owner receives other grain when presenting
his receipt for continuing the shipment, does not take away from the interstate char-
acter of the through shipment. ...
Id. at 33-34.
17- 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
1.6 Id. at 521, 547, 551 (citing the National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195
(1933)).
177 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
178 Ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (1935).
M ' Carter, 298 U.S. at 239.
,6o Id. at 305.
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in his majority opinion, Justice Sutherland wrote categorically that
"[t]he relation of employer and employee is a local relation."181
E.C. Knight's basic distinction between manufacture and com-
merce thus held firm as late as Carter in 1936. The emerging pat-
tern said, for example, that the Ford Motor Company did not
manufacture goods in interstate commerce, but the Northern Pa-
cific Railroad shipped them in interstate commerce. As constitu-
tional principles go, this line was relatively clear. It is just the line
that is observed today in the dormant commerce clause cases,182
and it is as intelligible with the affirmative power cases as with the
dormant power cases.
This third line of cases under the commerce clause added to con-
gressional power, but it surely did not lead to the conclusion that
Congress should have the comprehensive power to regulate the en-
tire business of life. The Court had expanded the reach of earlier
cases involving the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce."
This broadened scope to the commerce power allowed Congress to
regulate matters actually outside the scope of commerce in order
to regulate what fell within its admitted power. But the over-
breadth doctrine was applied only in cases that did not involve
common carriers. And Congress' power to prohibit the shipment of
certain kinds of goods in commerce was sharply, but correctly, lim-
ited by Hammer v. Dagenhart to those things noxious in them-
selves. 83 The totality of commerce clause jurisprudence as it
emerged before the New Deal may not have been perfect; indeed it
probably yielded a bit too much to federal power, at least under
the power to regulate instrumentalities of commerce and the power
to regulate the type of goods shipped in interstate commerce. But
the set of rules was surely workable. This state of affairs was to
change in the 1930's. The final Part of this Article will trace the
rapid decline of the old distinctions, and will briefly note the re-
grettable social consequences that followed in the wake of depar-
tures from sound constitutional principle.
181 Id. at 308.
182 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
"I Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 25, 271 (1918); see supra notes 120-40.
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V. THE NEW DEAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The New Deal cases systematically removed each of the previous
limitations on the scope of the commerce clause. This expansion of
federal power was not driven by any textual necessity. Instead, it is
better understood, but hardly justified, as a response to two sepa-
rate but related forces. First, the 1936 Roosevelt mandate and the
prospect of court packing could hardly have been lost on the
Court.18 4 Second, a narrow majority of the Court was in sympathy
with the dominant intellectual belief of the time that national
problems required national responses. The New Deal cases worked
a revolution in constitutional theory as well as in textual interpre-
tation. The original theory of the Constitution was based on the
belief that government was not an unrequited good, but was at
best a necessary evil. The system of enumerated powers allowed
state governments to compete among themselves, thus limiting the
risks of governmental abuse even absent explicit, substantive limi-
tations on the laws that states could pass. The various limitations
upon the federal power helped achieve this end. The New Deal
conception, on the other hand, saw no virtue in competition,
whether between states or between firms. The old barriers were
stripped away; in their place has emerged the vast and unwar-
ranted concentration of power in Congress that remains the hall-
mark of the modern regulatory state.
The first major case to test the traditional analysis of the com-
merce clause was NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,85 which
involved a challenge to the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act). 88 The Wagner Act in essence removed employers' power to
hire and fire at will, instead requiring extensive collective bargain-
ing in good faith between employers and unions if the union is ap-
proved by a majority of employees.187 The unions were selected by
a majority of workers, but had the power to bind workers who dis-
sented. 88 Individual contracts inconsistent with the master agree-
184 See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 128-30 (11th ed. 1985).
185 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Companion cases to Jones & Laughlin were NLRB v. Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937), and NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S.
49 (1937).
1-8 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)).
,8, See id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5).
I'l See id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a).
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ment were unenforceable, lest the union's power be undermined by
dissatisfied workers.189
The Wagner Act was based squarely upon the commerce clause.
The draftsmen sought to meet the fundamental challenge of juris-
diction by providing that federal jurisdiction extended not only to
cases of "commerce" but also to cases "affecting commerce": "The
term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or ob-
structing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing com-
merce or the free flow of commerce."190
This extended definition proves that Congress used a legal fic-
tion to expand federal jurisdiction beyond its original grant. The
commerce clause does not say "Congress shall have the power to
regulate commerce, and all matters affecting commerce with for-
eign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
The statutory text, moreover, invited a favorable outcome on the
jurisdictional question by smuggling into its expanded definition of
commerce the desirable effects that the labor statute was intended
to achieve. Yet there was no real evidence that local regulation of
employment markets was incapable of achieving desired economic
goals. It was only the distinct New Deal bias for worker monopolies
protected by explicit barriers to entry (here, against rival workers
who would work for less) that could have led to the conclusion that
the Wagner Act would improve the free flow of commerce. How
cartelization of labor markets would remove barriers or obstruc-
tions to interstate commerce has never been explained. Labor
cartelization generally raises the level of wages and reduces the
quantity of goods produced. When a cartel is legally protected
against new entrants into its market, the new entrants are no
longer able to take advantage of the price "umbrella" that an un-
regulated cartel necessarily creates for enterprising rivals. The
Wagner Act surely had an effect on commerce, and that effect was
negative.
A system of limited government keeps local governments in com-
petition with each other. This sensible institutional arrangement
was wholly undermined by Congress' decision, in the teeth of the
commerce clause, to subject all employment markets to nationally
8I See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
110 Id. at 450.
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uniform regulation. As in the case of child labor laws, the power of
states to impose collective bargaining requirements on firms is ef-
fectively limited by the ability of old firms to leave the state and of
new ones not to enter it. Also, since domestic firms can escape
whatever misguided tariff barriers may be thrown up against inter-
national suppliers of goods and services, the level of state regula-
tion is effectively curtailed, and the volume of goods and services
in commerce increases.
The transformation in legislative and judicial thinking about the
commerce clause is revealed by the reversal in substantive out-
comes. Gibbons v. Ogden ensured free trade by overturning a
state-granted legal monopoly. 191 The Sherman Act cases were also
directed against private monopolies-a lesser peril-which were
seen improperly as "regulating" interstate commerce. 192 Both Gib-
bons and the Sherman Act cases were attempts to facilitate free
trade in open markets-one at the constitutional, the other at the
statutory, level. With the later expansion of congressional jurisdic-
tion by such laws as the Transportation Act of 1920, however, the
commerce clause became an instrument to suppress competition,
rather than one to further it.""s It is only if one thinks that govern-
ment can neutrally determine when there is too much competition
as well as when there is too little that the broader interpretation of
the commerce power becomes plausible. And it is clear that the
New Deal thinkers thought they understood the vices of
competition.194
It is always, however, a precarious venture for judges to make
independent normative judgments about the desirability of certain
social arrangements when passing on the constitutionality of cer-
tain acts. In a sense, the task of interpretation should depend, as
Chief Justice Marshall did in Gibbons v. Ogden, on the natural and
ordinary sense of the word. 9 5 The approach also leads, however, to
See supra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
19 See supra notes 141-83 and accompanying text.
,' See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
19 "There would appear to be no difference in the constitutional power to protect inter-
state commerce against unduly high prices, as in the Sherman Act, and excessively low
prices, as in the New Deal legislation." Stern, supra note 32, at 651. The economic error is to
think that prices, rather than economic structure, are the source of any misallocation of
resources.
"I See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824).
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the conclusion that the Wagner Act goes beyond the scope of the
commerce clause under the authority of E.C. Knight and, most no-
tably, Carter.98 The three decisions of the United States Courts of
Appeals that passed upon the Wagner Act declared it unconstitu-
tional by applying the precedents mechanically.1 97 Recall that the
hard question in E.C. Knight was whether prospective restraints of
trade in interstate markets could justify an intrusion into manu-
facture, an area normally regulated by the states. Jones & Laugh-
lin, of course, involved no effort to monopolize an interstate mar-
ket. Quite the opposite; the contracts at issue concerned only
matters of local employment which, as the Court's opinion in
Carter had confirmed, had never been thought a federal matter
under any prior conception of the commerce clause. 198
To respond to this difficulty, the Court in Jones & Laughlin res-
urrected the losing argument of Carter-that anything which had
a substantial effect upon interstate commerce could be regulated
regardless of its source.""9 In so doing, the Court in effect borrowed
the language of those cases concerned with the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce20 0 and applied it generally, as if the original
subject-matter restriction had not been integral to the earlier deci-
sions. Manufacture was no longer distinguishable from commerce,
because the manufacturing process involved "a great movement of
iron ore, coal and limestone along well-defined paths to the steel
mills, thence through them, and thence in the form of steel prod-
ucts into the consuming centers of the country-a definite and
well-understood course of business. '201
To be sure, Chief Justice Hughes acknowledged in Jones &
Laughlin that some "internal concerns" of the state remained
"' See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); E.C. Knight Co. v. United States,
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
1"7 See NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 85 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. 49
(1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 85 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301
U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1936), rev'd,
301 U.S. 1 (1937). The circuit opinions were reprinted in full in Justice McReynolds' dissent
to all three of these cases. See Labor Board Cases, 301 U.S. 76, 79-84 (1937) (McReynolds,
J., dissenting).
199 Carter, 298 U.S. at 308-09.
199 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37; see Carter, 298 U.S. at 317 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
200 See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-37 (quoting Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U.S. 1, 47 (1911); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870)).
201 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 34-35 (quoting the government's argument).
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outside the power of Congress to regulate.2 02 But it was all lip ser-
vice; the companion cases to Jones & Laughlin showed that the
"internal concerns of a state" had become an empty vessel. NLRB
v. Fruehauf Co. applied the Wagner Act to a manufacturer of com-
mercial trailers that obtained more than fifty percent of its mate-
rial out of state and sold eighty percent of its output to out-of-
state customers.20 3 NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.
used the same logic, applying the statute to a clothing manufac-
turer that purchased most of its raw cloth out of state, and sold a
majority of its finished garments there as well.20 4 The commerce
clause was thus hardly limited to the integrated multistate firms
like Jones & Laughlin. And beneath the legal analysis lay the ulti-
mate policy reason for the decisions: Congress and the NLRB be-
lieved that industry-wide unionizations could not succeed without
federal assistance, and the Court accepted this belief, and the de-
sirability of the substantive conclusion, at face value.20 5
The cases that followed Jones & Laughlin continued to sustain
the power of the federal government to regulate interstate com-
merce expansively, on the ground that any competition among
states necessarily restricted the scope of government action. The
government's argument in United States v. Darby20 6 in defense of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),0 7 for example, was essen-
tially identical to that made unsucessfully a generation before in
202 Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an extreme as to
destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself establishes, between com-
merce "among the several States" and the internal concerns of a State. That distinc-
tion between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital
to the maintenance of our federal system.
Id. at 30.
20- NLRB v. Fruehauf Co., 301 U.S. 49, 50 (1937).
204 NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 73 (1937).
210 The Court in Friedman-Harry Marks wrote:
With effective competition between the industry's enterprises an accepted fact re-
gardless of location, and bearing in mind the purpose and effect of the migration of
enterprises, it seems unavoidable that the members of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers should, as they do, regard the industry as one whose economic organization
is not based on the interests of each individual enterprise, but is one in which union
conditions, to be maintained at all, must prevail generally.
Id. at 59.
206 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
207 Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)).
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Hammer v. Dagenhart:
No State, acting alone, could require labor standards substantially
higher than those obtaining in other States whose producers and
manufacturers competed in the interstate market. Employers with
lower labor standards possess an unfair advantage in interstate
competition, and only the national government can deal with the
problem. °s
The Court's unanimous decision upholding the FLSA accepted
the substantive case for the statute at face value, and regarded the
FLSA as essentially public interest rather than interest-group leg-
islation. 0 9 Arguments in favor of Hammer's limits on federal
power-were curtly dismissed: "The motive and purpose of a regula-
tion of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judg-
ment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restric-
tion and over which the courts are given no control. 2 10
There remained only the question whether federal power ex-
tended to those goods of local manufacture which were not shipped
in interstate commerce. In this regard Justice Stone cited the
Shreveport Rate Case to support the proposition that a "familiar
like exercise of power is the regulation of intrastate transactions
which are so commingled with or related to interstate commerce
that all must be regulated if the interstate commerce is to be effec-
tively controlled. '21 Justice Stone omitted any reference to the de-
sire to fight local discrimination against interstate commerce that
was so critical to the earlier decision, or to any recognition that the
Shreveport Rate Case did not apply to all "intrastate transac-
tions" but only to the "instrumentalities" of interstate com-
merce-in particular to interstate railroad operations.21 2 Nor did
Justice Stone acknowledge that the Shreveport Rate Case never
challenged the distinction between commerce and manufacture de-
fended in E.C. Knight. Justice Holmes in his Hammer dissent de-
fending federal authority still recognized that some manufacture
208 Darby, 312 U.S. at 102 (the government's argument).
209 Id. at 115.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 121.
212 Id. at 109 n.1. Justice Stone's version of The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342
(1914), was adopted by Justice Jackson in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-34 (1942).
See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
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was part of the purely internal commerce of the state.2 13 Yet such
was the strength of the federal tide that Justice Stone abandoned
that vestige of state autonomy in Darby.14 The question of state
autonomy, so critical to E.C. Knight, also received back-of-the-
hand treatment in Darby; the Court brushed aside the tenth
amendment, and the principle of enumerated powers that it articu-
lated, as "but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.1 1 5
Justice Stone's cavalier treatment of jurisdictional objections to
the FLSA resulted from his powerful belief in the soundness of the
basic social legislation involved."' To him, the suppression of "un-
fair" competition from exploited labor was the dominant "evil" the
FLSA attacked. 7 The possibility that the minimum wage law
could be a barrier to the entry of unskilled labor into the labor
market, and hence the very evil to be avoided, was never assessed.
What failed in Darby was not the language of the Constitution, but
the willingness of the Justices to accept the theory of limited gov-
ernment upon which it rested.
The same failure was repeated in cases that sustained the power-
ful system of agricultural price supports and acreage restrictions
that was introduced by the New Deal. The question in United
States v. Wrightwood Dairy1 s was whether Congress could author-
ize the Secretary of Agriculture to set minimum prices for milk
that was produced and consumed within a single state. The usual
language which spoke of a transaction "which directly burdens, ob-
structs, or affects, interstate or foreign commerce in such commod-
ity or product thereof," was duly set out in the statutory lan-
guage. 9 Ironically, the anticompetitive effect of federal interstate
milk regulation became the justification for a further expansion of
federal power:
As the court below recognized, and as seems not to be disputed,
the marketing of intrastate milk which competes with that shipped
113 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
214 See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.
2S1 Id. at 124.
See id. at 122.
217 Id.
2-8 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
211 See id. at 116 (quoting the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50
Stat. 246 (current version at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985))).
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interstate would tend seriously to break down price regulation of
the latter. Under the conditions prevailing in the milk industry, as
the record shows, the unregulated sale of the intrastate milk tends
to reduce the sales price received by handlers and the amount
which they in turn pay to producers."220
Even after Wrightwood plugged the loophole of intrastate sales,
another obstacle remained to comprehensive federal agricultural
regulation. Farmers could still influence the price of agricultural
products in interstate commerce simply by keeping and using them
on their own farms. The scope of agricultural regulation expanded
to meet this challenge. Wickard v. Filburn221 upheld the statutory
authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to limit the consumption
of wheat on the very farms that grew it. Here there was no sale
transaction at all, but this did not matter to the Court. The gov-
ernment's ability to maintain artificially high regulated prices for
goods shipped across interstate lines would surely have been com-
promised if local consumption had been allowed to expand supply
to meet demand. The economic interdependence of the various ac-
tivities was held to preclude any watertight division between pro-
duction and commerce.222 The Court regarded the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce as quite
beside the point (as indeed it was), and the entire issue of enumer-
ated powers and state autonomy disappeared from view.223 Once
the Court decided to ignore the limitations of the Shreveport Rate
Case,224 it saw Wickard as a natural extention of the Shreveport
Rate Case doctrine. This is just the approach that Justice Jackson
took:
The opinion of Mr. Justice Hughes found federal intervention con-
stitutionally authorized because of "matters having such a close
and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is es-
sential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the effi-
ciency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of condi-
tions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon
fair terms and without molestation or hindrance.225
220 Id. at 120.
221 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
222 See id. at 120.
222 See id.
224 The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
225 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123 (quoting The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351).
HeinOnline  -- 73 Va. L. Rev.  1450 1987
Commerce Power
Carefully excised from the quotation was the beginning of Jus-
tice Hughes's sentence: "[Congress'] authority, extending to these
interstate carriers as instruments of interstate commerce, necessa-
rily embraces the right to control their operations in all matters
.... ,"226 This excision, doubtless deliberate, completed the trans-
formation of the commerce clause.
The question then arises as to how is it possible to stand a clause
of the Constitution upon its head. I do not think that the explana-
tion comes from any vagueness in the language of the commerce
clause.227 If a Court innocent of political theory or of any predelic-
tion on the merits of the underlying legislation approached a com-
merce case, it could not possibly parse the words of the clause so as
to reach the extravagant interpretations of federal power accepted
in Jones & Laughlin, Darby, Wrightwood, and Wickard. Could
anyone say with a straight face that the consumption of home-
grown wheat is "commerce among the several states?" A powerful
principle must have led to so fanciful a conclusion. That principle
has to go to the idea of what kind of government and social organi-
zation is thought to be just and proper for society at large.
I have no doubt that the Justices of the Supreme Court who
forged so powerful a doctrine had such a conception in mind. At
one level they rejected the idea of limited federal government and
decentralized power. That idea only made sense if there was a risk
that governments could misbehave. If it was thought that they al-
ways acted in the public interest, then any effort to deny them
substantive power would have hobbled the forces of virtue and en-
hanced those of wickedness. It is noticeable that all the key New
Deal commerce. clause opinions took the substantive findings of
Congress at face value. None was prepared to identify the powerful
interest group politics that were so evident in both the labor and
agricultural cases-the very policy areas in which the commerce
clause reached its present scope. Once government is thought to be
the source of risk, however, then competition between governments
makes sense, and there is good reason to uphold the ideas of lim-
116 The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351. Professor Tribe's rendition of the The
Shreveport Rate Case's sentence suppresses this first clause as well, with the exception of
keeping the word "control" and dropping the words "their operations in." Tribe, supra note
28, § 5-4, at 235 (quoting The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351).
'17 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
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ited government and enumerated federal powers that were part of
the original design. The New Deal's change in attitude toward the
commerce clause thus depended upon a radical reorientation of ju-
dicial views toward the role of government that in the end over-
whelmed the relatively clean lines of the commerce clause.
In addition, the key federal laws of the New Deal cartelized ei-
ther labor or product markets that would otherwise have been
highly competitive absent government regulation.228 Indeed, there
were substantive challenges to each of these laws, usually under
the due process clause.2 9 These developments were not unrelated,
for jurisdictional limitations upon the power of Congress only
made sense if there was reason to think that use of the power
would have been harmful. Yet once the idea that markets per-
formed useful functions was cast aside, the jurisdictional limita-
tions ceased to make any sense. The war cry became a call for Con-
gress to act because, in an age of economic interdependence,
national problems demanded national solutions. °
Yet the point about economic interdependence mistakes the dis-
ease for the cure. It is precisely because markets are interdepen-
dent that there is reason to fear comprehensive federal regula-
tion.231 Competitive markets are the best way to allocate scarce
228 Descriptively, one reason why there is little federal regulation of land use, for example,
is that the markets for land tend to be more local than national. For these markets federal
regulation is of little assistance, so regulation is apt to take place at the local level. But
where the economics change, as with strip-mining, the regulation becomes federal. For my
views on how the eminent domain clause of the fifth amendment, as applied to both federal
and state governments, should function, see R. Epstein, supra note 156; Epstein, supra note
34.
229 See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 129-33; Darby, 312 U.S. at 125; Jones & Laughlin, 301
U.S. at 43-49. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 110, is an apparent exception, but only be-
cause the question whether the state could control the price of milk had already been re-
solved in favor of the state. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
220 Professor Tribe has written that
Hammer v. Dagenhart highlights the tension that existed between the Supreme
Court's taxonomic approach to the commerce clause in the early 20th century-an
approach grounded in the theory of dual sovereignty and sustained by a faith in the
market as the proper mechanism for distributing wealth-and the increasingly unde-
niable consequences of economic interdependence.
Tribe, supra note 28, § 5-7, at 238 n.l. The word "creating" should be inserted in place of
"distributing" to understand the economic case.
231 Moreover, there is reason to fear local regulation that is designed to preclude external
competition, as in Gibbons. Indeed, the great achievement of the commerce clause has been
its negative side, which has precluded state regulation even when the federal government
has not acted. Perhaps the ideal form of the commerce clause should have been negative:
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goods and services. They promise to bring price into line with the
marginal cost of production, and they hold out some hope that all
the possible gains from trade will be achieved by voluntary trans-
actions. Markets are not just a good in themselves. They are pow-
erful instruments for human happiness and well-being.
Legal monopolies have precisely the opposite effect. They raise
price above marginal cost and they prevent many voluntary trans-
actions from taking place, so that the total social output is reduced
by the deadweight loss that they cause. Worse still, the ability to
obtain legal protection against competition invites individuals and
groups to spend valuable resources in order to obtain (or resist ob-
taining) economic rents.232 Even though no market is an ideal com-
petitive market, there is absolutely no reason to impose economic
regulations, such as minimum price laws or cartelization of labor
markets, whose only effect is to drive quantity and price further
from the competitive equilibrium. When viewed from this perspec-
tive, the Wagner Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Agri-
cultural Marketing Acts appear to be long-standing social disasters
that could not long have survived with their present vigor solely at
the state level.
There is a dangerous tendency to assume that competitive injury
and physical injury form part of a seamless web, so that the power
to regulate the one necessarily confers the authority to regulate the
other. It is as though the power to protect interstate commerce
against robbers and thieves 233 is sufficient warrant for the far more
extensive social controls that treat competitive activities under-
taken within different states, when the social consequences of vio-
lence and competition are so radically different.234 The ability to
conceive of competitive injury as a justification for the exercise of
federal power lies at the root of all the modern commerce clause
"No state shall have any power to pass legislation that interferes with the freedom of com-
merce among the several states." There are of course difficulties to this proposal. For exam-
ple, it makes any sensible response to the long-haul/short-haul problem difficult. The mis-
chief of excessive federal action, however, is far greater.
232 See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. Econ. J. 224,
232 (1967), for the first demonstration of the point. I have addressed some of these
problems in Epstein, supra note 34.
233 See supra note 62.
"3 For the modern analogue, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985), dealing with the ability of the federal government to regulate the states them-
selves under the commerce clause.
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decisions. The ability to perceive the essential difference between
violence and competition is all that is needed to respect the limita-
tion on federal power that is implicit in the commerce clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
I thus return to my original theme: Although questions of juris-
diction and substantive rights appear to be distinct, the unfortu-
nate history of decisionmaking under the commerce clause shows
how unbreakable is the link between them. The very distinction
between violence and competitive harm that is necessary for or-
ganizing the private and public substantive law is critical to an un-
derstanding of the proper principles of federal jurisdiction. Hamil-
ton may not have had it all correct when he said that sound
limitations on government jurisdiction obviated the need for a bill
of rights.235 But he was surely correct when he said that the main-
tenance of those jurisdictional limitations is one essential bulwark
to sound constitutional government.3 8
The problem of sovereignty remains: How do the people compel
the holders of governmental monopoly power to act as though they
could only obtain a competitive return for their services? 237 Feder-
alism facilitates a solution by allowing easy exit, as well as by al-
lowing voice. National regulation prevents unhealthy types of com-
petition among jurisdictions, such as were present in Gibbons.
Under this view, the old construction of the commerce clause
makes sense; it facilitates national markets by preventing state
balkanization. This was the achievement of Gibbons. The great
peril of national regulation is that it may be taken too far, to im-
pose national uniformity which frustrates, rather than facilitates
markets. This was the New Deal. I cannot help thinking that a
sound view of the commerce clause is one that returns to Gibbons.
The affirmative scope of the commerce power should be limited to
those matters that today are governed by the dormant commerce
clause: interstate transportation, navigation and sales, and the ac-
tivities closely incident to them. All else should be left to the
states.
I realize that this conclusion seems radical because of the way
13' See The Federalist No. 84 (A. Hamilton); supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
2" See id.
217 See R. Epstein, supra note 156, ch. 2.
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the clock has turned. One is hesitant to require dismantling of
large portions of the modern federal government, given the enor-
mous reliance interests that have been created. And I do not have,
nor do I know of anyone who has, a good theory that explains
when it is appropriate to correct past errors that have become em-
bedded in the legal system. It is far easier to keep power from the
hands of government officials than it is to wrest it back from them
once it has been conferred. We had our chance with the commerce
clause, and we have lost it.
Still, the argument from principle seems clear enough, even if
one is left at a loss as to what should be done about it. And in a
sense that is just the point. Congress and the courts can proceed
merrily on their way if they are convinced that the basis for an
extensive federal commerce power is rooted firmly in the original
constitutional text or structure. But uneasiness necessarily creeps
into the legislative picture if, as I have argued, the commerce
clause is far narrower in scope than modern courts have held.
There is a powerful tension between the legacy of the past fifty
years and the original constitutional understanding. It is a tension
that we must face, even if we cannot resolve it.
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